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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 910019 
v. : 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, : 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder in the 
first degree, a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202 (1990), and from the imposition of a sentencing 
enhancement of twenty years, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Should this Court refuse to consider defendant's 
claims that (1) death-qualification of the jury violates the Utah 
Constitution, (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury 
on the elements of aggravated murder and (3) Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), the "gang enhancement," violates due 
process, is void for vagueness and creates a new offense, when he 
either totally failed to preserve such claims or only nominally 
alluded to them in the trial court? A reviewing court will 
decline to review claims which a defendant has failed to preserve 
for review through a timely and specific objection in the trial 
court. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1141 (Utah 1989) 
(declining to review a general motion to dismiss an element of 
the offense because the asserted grounds "were not specifically 
or distinctly stated to the court below"). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's claim 
that the prosecution discriminatorily used its peremptory 
challenges against two Hispanic jurors? A party attacking a 
peremptory jury challenge on equal protection grounds must 
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; if a 
prima facie case is established, the challenged party must then 
provide a race-neutral explanation to rebut the prima facie case. 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1721 
(1986); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 338 (Utah 1991). 
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings of whether 
purposeful discrimination has occurred must be given deference 
and will only be set aside if clearly erroneous. State v. Cantu 
1111/ 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769, 778 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). If 
inadequate factual findings exist, the matter must be remanded to 
the trial court for further determination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725; State v. Cantu m , 750 P.2d 591, 597 
(Utah 1988). If purposeful discrimination in the use of the 
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state's peremptory challenges is ultimately found, reversal of 
the defendant's conviction is mandated without regard to the 
harmlessness of the constitutional error, Batson, 476 U.S. at 
100, 106 S. Ct. at 1725. Contra Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780; Cantu 
m , 750 P.2d at 597 (both incorrectly holding that a "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is applicable). 
3. Was there sufficient evidence that defendant 
committed the murder of Don Newingham, a homicide incident to one 
criminal episode in which Shayne Newingham was killed? "In 
considering [whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [The appellate court] 
reverse[s] a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted). It is defendant's burden to 
marshal evidence supporting the jury's verdict when challenging 
sufficiency of evidence. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
4. Was the trial court's finding that defendant acted 
in concert with two or more persons under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) clearly erroneous? When challenging a 
trial court's factual findings, "the appellant must show that the 
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findings of fact were clearly erroneous" by marshaling "all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and 
then demonstrat[ing] that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Fred A. Alvarez was charged by amended 
information with two counts of murder in the first degree, a 
capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990) 
(amended 1991 J1, for intentionally or knowingly causing the 
deaths of Don and Shayne Newingham (R. 29-31). Following a jury 
trial, defendant was convicted of intentionally or knowingly 
causing the death of Don Newingham (Count I) and was acquitted of 
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of Shayne Newingham 
(Count II) (R. 193-95). Defendant waived hearing before the jury 
in the sentencing proceedings (T. 1414-15). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to life imprisonment, and further imposed an 
enhancement of twenty years imprisonment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
1
 The 1991 amendment to section 76-5-202 eliminated the 
"first degree" designation. The level of murder is now called 
"aggravated murder." 
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Re: Imposition of Sentence and Applicability of § 76-3-203.1 
U.C.A., R. 344-48, attached at Addendum B; Judgment, Commitment 
and Sentence, R. 352, attached at Addendum C). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Friday, June 8, 1990, defendant and fifteen to 
twenty juveniles were at the home of Kim and Richard Gabaldon, 
where defendant and his companions were partying and drinking 
beer and tequila (T. 604-616). At about 12:00 midnight, Kenny 
Salas, Paul Velasquez, Robert Rivas, Don Newingham and Shayne 
Newingham, having heard of the party from a friend of Salas, 
drove in Velasquez's car to the Gabaldon residence (T. 618, 865, 
872). Both Don and Shayne, along with Salas, had earlier drunk 
beer, vodka and snorted cocaine (T. 864). 
Upon arriving at the Gabaldon residence, Kenny and Don 
walked toward the front door of the house. At the same time 
those within the house, including Richie Gabaldon, Manuel 
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHerrera and defendant, moved 
toward the door to see who was approaching (T. 619-21, 874, 919-
22, 1262-63). Salas, who both Gabaldon and defendant knew, 
inquired whether his friend was at the party and whether they 
could join in (T. 619-24, 922-23). Gabaldon refused, saying that 
he did not want Don, a stranger, in his house (T. 624). Don and 
Gabaldon argued back and forth, when suddenly defendant pulled 
out a large-bladed knife and ordered them to leave (T. 623-25, 
629-31, 923-24, 1263). 
Don was at first still reluctant to leave, but then 
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responded to Salas's pulling at his arm (T. 631). Defendant and 
Gabaldon, with fifteen to twenty people behind them, followed 
Salas and Don to the car (T. 631-35, 876, 925). As defendant 
approached the car he saw Velasquez, with whom he was also 
friendly, greeted him by putting his arm around his shoulder, and 
suggested that he return to the party when he had taken the 
Newinghams home (T. 878-80, 1264-65). Meanwhile, as Don got back 
into the car, he muttered, "I'm not going to let no little punk 
stick me," whereupon Gabaldon got into an argument with him and 
punched him in the face (T. 636, 636, 876-80, 926-27, 950). 
Don quickly wrestled Gabaldon to the ground (T. 927). 
According to Salas and Velasquez, defendant immediately ran 
around the car, jumped on Don's back and stabbed him deeply in 
the back about four times (T. 881-87, 924-28). Don jerked 
defendant off his back, and defendant stabbed himself in the leg 
while falling back (T. 928). In the course of this attack 
everybody started running toward the car (T. 950-51). As Don 
went down, people were kicking and punching him. Don's blood was 
all over his back and Salas's shirt as Salas tried to pick Don up 
and cover him in the midst of this attack, helped by Gina Silva, 
one of the girls attending the party (T. 886, 929-30, 1178-80). 
As soon as the first punch was thrown at his father, 
Shayne Newingham jumped out to help, yelling words to the effect, 
"Don't mess with my dad" (T. 645, 883, 950-51, 1038). He was 
confronted by Gabaldon, Manuel Alvarez, Manuel Martinez, Tony 
DeHerrera and Fernando Negrete, and he began fighting with all of 
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them (T. 884-85, 935, 950-51, 1037, 1071, 1160). Velasquez then 
saw defendant run around and stab Shayne just as he had Don (T. 
886-87). Shayne went down in about 10 seconds, almost at the 
same time as Don, whereupon Gabaldon, DeHerrera and Manuel 
Alvarez kicked and stomped him in the head (T. 886-87, 929-30, 
952, 1106, 1180, 1219-23, 1229-30). 
The entire fight lasted about five minutes (T. 582). 
Gabaldon testified that the entire episode happened "so fast" 
that he believed the victims had only been knocked out, but he 
admitted kicking Shayne and then stomping Don in the face as he 
lay face up on the ground while Gabaldon's sister, Kim, implored 
him to stop, yelling, "Leave him alone. You're killing him" (T. 
647-56). At trial, Gabaldon's right Converse shoe with Don's 
blood on its sole, State's exhibit #30, was received in evidence 
(T. 653, 672, 828-29). While at the hospital, Salt Lake City 
Police Officer Randall Hunnewell observed and photographed a 
shoeprint on Don's forehead (State's Ex. #7; T. 757). 
Rivas and Velasquez testified that right after Don and 
Shayne had dropped to the ground, Gabaldon said, "Get those white 
people out of here" (T. 888, 952). Defendant was helped into the 
house by two girls that had attended the party (T. 652). Gina 
Silva ran into the house to get towels when she saw Shayne's 
bloody back while he was still standing, and then told Kim 
Gabaldon to call for an ambulance. When she exited the house she 
found both Newinghams down on the ground (T. 1179-80). 
Martinez rejected Salas's request that he help him with 
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the Newinghams, and took off with Negrete (T. 1074), Salas 
remained with Don and Shayne while Velasquez and Rivas drove to a 
nearby 7-Eleven store (T. 888-89)- While Velasquez called for an 
ambulance, Gabaldon drove by in the company of defendant, 
DeHerrera and Manuel Alvarez. According to both Gabaldon and 
Velasquez, defendant, while attempting to exit from the moving 
car, called out words to the effect, "I'm going to get you next." 
However, Gabaldon pulled defendant back in, and the party 
continued on its way to LDS Hospital (T. 665-70, 890-92). Later, 
both Don and Shayne were also taken to LDS Hospital (T. 756). 
Defendant claimed that the fight broke out as he was 
talking with Velasquez. He then ran towards the rear of the car 
when he saw the glare of Don's knife coming at him. He jumped 
back, stuck up his leg and got stabbed. He then reached for his 
knife and started swinging it keep Don away (T. 1265-66, 1304-
05). He admitted it was possible that he might have stabbed Don 
once, but that he did not intend to kill anyone and that Salas 
and Velasquez were lying about how he stabbed the Newinghams (T. 
1266, 1326-27, 1338-39). However, Andrew Duggar, defendant's 
cellmate following the preliminary hearing, testified that 
defendant had admitted to him that he had stabbed Don and that he 
was not sure if he had stabbed Shayne (T. 846). 
Eight witnesses for the defense, all present at the 
fight, collectively testified that: (1) they did not see 
defendant in the course of the fight (T. 1094, 1126, 1141); (2) 
they did not see defendant with a knife (T. 1041); (3) they did 
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not see defendant stab anyone (T. 1070, 1105, 1258); (4) they did 
not see either of the victims stabbed (T. 1036, 1125, 1163, 1188, 
1258); (5) they saw no blood (T. 1067, 1094); and (6) they did 
not see anybody with a knife (T. 1141). Instead, five of these 
witnesses collectively testified that Tony DeHerrera had offered 
one of them the use of a knife during the fight (T. 1032), held 
bloody knives following the fight (T. 1129-30), sought to have 
the knives hidden following the fight (T. 1143) and admitted to 
stabbing at least one of the victims (T. 1055, 1097, 1109, 1114, 
1143). Anthony Valerio testified that he saw DeHerrera stab 
Shayne (T. 1236, 1256). 
In searching the Gabaldons' home, Salt Lake City Police 
Officer John Campbell located in a washing machine a black-
handled buck knife which appeared to have been secreted beneath 
some wet clothing (State's Ex. #24; T. 768-70). Utah Crime Lab 
serologist Pilar Shortsleeve identified human blood on the blade 
of the knife (T. 813). Salas and Velasquez both identified the 
knife as that which defendant used in stabbing the Newinghams (T. 
882, 924). A small pocket knife, State's exhibit #14, was 
retrieved from Don's levis pants pocket. The knife was closed 
and covered with blood later identified as Don's (T. 735, 830). 
Dr. Todd Gray, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of 
Utah, performed autopsies on both Don's and Shayne's bodies (T. 
965). Shayne was stabbed once in the armpit and three times in 
the back. Two of the wounds were to a depth of about six inches, 
and one of the wounds indicated that the knife had been 
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reinserted after it had been partially withdrawn. Abrasion marks 
from the hilt of the knife suggested the force with which the 
blow was struck (T. 865-72). Don was stabbed three times in the 
back, even more deeply, one of the thrusts leaving a gaping wound 
(T. 991-999). Both Newinghams died of multiple stab wounds, 
consistent with State's exhibit #24 (T. 983, 990, 1002-03). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant failed to preserve for review his claims that 
(1) the process of "death qualification" of the jury venire 
violates the Utah Constitution, (2) in response to an inquiry, 
the trial court misled the jury concerning the elements of first 
degree murder and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203.1 (Supp. 1990), 
also known as the "gang enhancement," under which defendant was 
partially sentenced, is unconstitutional in various respects and 
was improperly applied. Motions made in support of these claims 
only nominally alluded, if at all, to the full range of arguments 
now made for the first time on appeal. By failing to make these 
claims in the trial court, defendant deprived the court of the 
opportunity to rule on the merits of his arguments. In this case 
the death penalty was not imposed. Thus, this Court should 
decline to review defendant's inadequately preserved claims. 
POINT II 
Defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the 
prosecution had used two of its peremptory challenges against 
alleged Hispanic jurors solely on account of race, a necessary 
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threshold in successfully maintaining a case under Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Defendant never 
established on the record that the stricken jurors were, in fact, 
Hispanic, or that striking two out of four such persons from the 
pattern demonstrated a discriminatory pattern of peremptory 
strikes. 
The trial court ruled that defendant had failed to make 
a prima facie case. Only after the court had made the ruling did 
the prosecution tender its race-neutral reasons, which rebutted 
any inference that the strikes were exercised on account of race. 
Rather, the prosecution adequately showed that the strikes were 
made on the basis of the juror's bias against the interests of 
the State. 
POINT III 
The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict that defendant had committed the first degree murder of 
Don Newingham, incident to the killing of Shayne Newingham in the 
course of one criminal episode. The homicides took place within 
moments of each other in the same location, all in the course of 
defendant, and his cohorts, acting to accomplish the single 
criminal objective of ejecting the victims from the premises with 
unlawful force. There was sufficient evidence to prove that 
defendant was principal in Shayne's fatal stabbing. Defendant's 
acquittal of that crime in the face of his conviction for an 
offense requiring two homicides is merely an inconsistency in the 
verdicts about which the Court can only speculate. This 
11 
conclusion holds good even if defendant must be shown to have 
been an accomplice and even in spite of an apparent inconsistency 
in defendant's having been acquitted of the killing of Shayne 
Newingham. 
POINT IV 
The trial court's findings, under the gang enhancement 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), that defendant 
acted in concert with two or more persons in committing murder 
were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. The 
evidence established that at least two other of defendant's 
companions could have been convicted of first degree murder, even 
though they were not. However, such a showing is not even 
required under the statute. Rather, the statute makes the 
enhancement applicable in situations where two or more persons, 
other than the principal actor, could be found guilty of lesser 




THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMS CONCERNING (1) THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE DEATH QUALIFICATION UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, (2) THE TRIAL COURT'S RESPONSE 
TO A JURY INQUIRY ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER AND (3) THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) 
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
Defendant claims on appeal that (1) the process of 
"death qualification" of the jury venire violates the Utah 
Constitution, (2) in response to an inquiry, the trial court 
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misled the jury concerning the elements of first degree murder 
and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203-1 (Supp. 1990), also known as 
the "gang enhancement," under which defendant was partially 
sentenced, is unconstitutional in various respects and was 
improperly applied (Appellant's Brief at Points I, IV and V, 
respectively). None of these claims was sufficiently preserved 
for appeal. 
A. Claims Either Omitted or Only 
Nominally Made are Insufficiently 
Preserved for Appeal and Should 
Not be Reviewed on Their Merits. 
Concerning the preservation of arguments for appeal, 
this Court has repeatedly stated: 
"A general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal." Importantly, the grounds 
for the objection must be distinctly and 
specifically stated. 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989) (citations 
omitted) (declining to review a general motion to dismiss an 
element of the offense because the asserted grounds "were not 
specifically or distinctly stated to the court below").2 
This general rule applies equally to constitutional 
2
 This Court has recognized an exception to the waiver rule 
in capital cases where the death penalty has been imposed, 
recognizing "the serious and permanent nature of the penalty 
imposed in such cases." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551-52 
(Utah 1987). Defendant was convicted of a capital crime, but did 
not receive the death penalty; therefore, the exception does not 
apply. 
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arguments raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). This Court has frequently 
found that defendants have waived constitutional rights by 
failing to assert them in the trial court. Among the rights that 
defendants have waived are the right to a public trial, State v. 
Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah 1989) ("failure of a 
defendant and his or her counsel to object to a closure order 
constitutes waiver of the defendant's right to a public trial 
under both the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution"), cert. 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (1991); the right to a speedy trial, State 
v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1193 (Utah 1984) ("[t]his Court has 
held that a defendant who has not asserted his or her right to a 
speedy trial in the lower court has waived the right to raise the 
issue on appeal"); the right to object to a prosecutor's comments 
on a defendant's failure to testify, State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 
1290, 1292 (Utah 1982) ("we are precluded from reaching the issue 
of their [prosecutor's comments] constitutionality by defendant's 
failure to object to them at trial"); and the right to challenge 
evidence that should have been suppressed, State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48, 53 (Utah) ("[The waiver] rule is particularly applicable to 
motions to suppress which should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations* . . . [T]here is no 
justification for not presenting all available grounds in support 
of a motion to suppress . . . • [A]n appellate court will not 
rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court"), cert, denied 
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454 U.S. 1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981). 
"Absent a timely objection, [a reviewing court] will 
review an alleged error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., 
only if it constitutes 'plain error.'" State v. Whittle, 780 
P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct not raised in the trial court and which 
was not plain error) (citations omitted). Except in "exceptional 
circumstances" a reviewing court will not entertain a claim 
raised for the first time on appeal. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 
1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, Jolivet v. Barnes, 493 U.S. 1033, 
110 S. Ct. 751 (1990).3 
"One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules 
like rule 103(a)(1)[, Utah Rules of Evidence,] is to assure that 
the trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that 
it erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) 
(considering an issue not raised at trial because the trial 
court, in a motion for a new trial, addressed the issue fully and 
did not rely on waiver). See also Hales, 652 P.2d at 1292 
3
 In this case there has been no allegation of plain error 
or exceptional circumstances which would have prevented defendant 
from presenting any of his claims at trial which he now asserts 
on appeal. Further, none of the errors claimed on appeal which 
the State asserts have been insufficiently preserved is obvious 
on the face of the record: The death-qualified jury has been 
approved by this Court in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 
1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook, 
949 P.2d 1546 (10 Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942 
(1992); defendant admits on appeal that jury instruction #11 
correctly instructs the jury on the elements of first degree 
murder (Appellant's Brief at 37); and the trial court had a right 
to assume that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1990) was 
constitutional, particularly in the absence of any supporting 
argument from defendant. 
15 
(refusing to consider a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, which 
this Court clearly regarded as meritorious, partly because the 
"trial court had no opportunity to rule on [the] matter and 
correct any of the alleged errors"). 
Similarly, the trial court is also effectively denied 
the opportunity to intelligibly rule in favor of a defendant or 
correct alleged errors when the defendant only nominally asserts 
an objection. In such circumstances the trial court is not 
presented with a substantial argument on which it can target a 
response. In State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982), this 
Court refused to consider the defendant's claim that "mug shots" 
were improperly admitted, even though the claim had merit, 
because the objection at trial was based on lack of foundation 
rather than prejudice, the grounds asserted on appeal. In so 
ruling, this Court cited with approval State v. Moore, 543 P.2d 
923 (Kan. 1975), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court held that the 
general objection, "Improper," to the prosecutor's attempt to 
introduce evidence of a prior conviction was insufficient because 
the defendant did not clearly state the specific grounds of his 
objection and did not identify what action he wished the court to 
take. McCardell, 652 P.2d at 947. See also State v. Elm, 808 
P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 1991) (holding that a general 
objection is insufficient to preserve specific claims on appeal. 
In State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), this Court 
refused to consider the defendant's only nominally made state 
constitutional claims where the defendant had actually relied on 
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parallel federal provisions. Id. at 1247 n.5. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has generally held that 
claims made under the Utah Constitution, only nominally raised in 
the trial court, are not adequately preserved for appeal and are 
thereby waived. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah 
App. 1989) (holding that "nominally alluding" to article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as an independent ground for 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, "without any 
analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the 
issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal"), rev'd on 
other grounds. State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State 
v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991) (same); State v. 
Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1992) (merely citing in a 
motion to suppress a case in which remand was based on article I, 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, alleged by the defendant on 
appeal to provide greater protection than the United States 
Constitution, was insufficient to preserve the matter for 
appeal), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah). 
B. Defendant's Motion to Preclude 
Death-Qualification of the Jury 
Venire Made Only Nominal Allusion 
to the Utah Constitution. 
Defendant's entire argument in his Motion to Preclude 
Death Qualification of the Jury Venire was that the death 
qualification of a jury Mden[ies] him of [sic] the right to a 
fair trial, in violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution" (R. 129, attached at Addendum D). The motion was 
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not accompanied by any supporting memorandum. Defendant failed 
to argue his claim to the trial court and merely alluded to this 
written motion at a hearing held on several motions, stating, 
M[T]he others have to do with the death-qualification of a jury 
and asking that those that believe in blood atonement be excused 
for cause at the outset and some other things that I think the 
Court can address itself to" (T. of Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R. 376 
at 7). Defendant never mentioned article I, sections 9 and 10 of 
the Utah Constitution at any point in the proceedings below. 
Further, the State addressed the death-qualification issue in its 
responsive memorandum and before the trial court only on federal 
constitutional grounds (R. 126-27; T. of Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R. 
376 at 8-9). Defendant, however, did not even attempt to direct 
the trial court's attention to a state constitutional argument, 
and thus effectively abandoned the issue. 
This Court has announced its willingness to entertain 
separate analyses under the Utah Constitution in criminal cases. 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). However, it should 
not entertain such analysis without requiring counsel to initiate 
that analysis at the trial level. This view finds support in 
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), which this Court has 
cited as a guide for state constitutional analysis. Earl, 716 
P.2d at 806. In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court stated, "it is 
the duty of the advocate to raise state constitutional issues, 
where appropriate, at the trial level and to diligently develop 
and plausibly maintain them on appeal." 500 A.2d at 238 
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(emphasis added). While defendant has presented this Court with 
a lengthy state constitutional argument on appeal, he utterly 
failed to raise the same constitutional issues in a manner that 
would have allowed the trial court to intelligently reflect upon 
them and has thereby waived consideration of those issues on 
appeal• 
C. Defendant Failed to Object to 
the Trial Court's Response to 
a Jury Inquiry Concerning the 
Elements of First Degree Murder, 
Defendant's assertion that the trial court incorrectly 
instructed the jury on the elements of first degree murder is 
based on a misreading of the record. In fact, defendant's 
assertion on appeal presumes an objection which was never made in 
the trial court. Defendant has therefore waived this Court's 
consideration of that issue. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
On appeal defendant develops the argument that the jury 
was mistakenly instructed on the elements of first degree murder 
so that it was only required to find that two persons were killed 
(Appellant's Brief, Point IV at 39). This argument hinges on the 
trial court's response to the second of two jury inquiries 
requesting clarification of the meaning of jury instruction #11, 
which sets forth the elements required to convict defendant of 
the first degree murder of Don Newingham (Jury Instruction #11, 
R. 303, attached at Addendum E). 
The first written inquiry appearing in the record was: 
"In order to find defendant guilty of 1st degree murder do we 
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have to find him guilty of both murders?" (R. 196, attached at 
Addendum F). The court responded to this question after 
consulting with defendant and the prosecutor (T. 1,406-08). The 
court correctly directed the jurors' attention to other 
instructions to answer this question/ Both defendant and the 
prosecutor stipulated to the trial court's response, defendant 
reserving his objection to the trial court's interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (1990), that interpretation being 
that the statute does not require that the same actor commit both 
murders (T. 1407). However, nowhere on appeal does defendant 
renew his claim that the statute requires that an actor commit 
both murders. 
The second written inquiry appearing of record was: 
"In Instruction #11 element #3. Do you need to satisfy all the 
elements or just one[?]" (Attached at Addendum F, R. 200). The 
court responded, "Any single element set forth in paragraph No. 3 
of Instruction No. 11 is sufficient" (R. 200). It is this 
response that defendant considers the real locus of the 
prejudicial error because, in his view, it relieves the jury from 
also finding that the "homicide was committed incident to one 
act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode" (Appellant's 
Brief at 39 n.25). However, there is no objection to this 
* The court responded, "You're first directed to Instruction 
No. Six. The elements of the offense are contained in 
Instruction 11 for Count 1 and Instruction 12 for Count 2. The 
definitions for these instructions are contained in Instructions 
No. 13, 15 and 18. By reviewing these instructions, you should 
be able to answer that question" (T. 1,407 and R. 196). 
20 
response in the record. Since there was neither an objection to 
this response, nor anything of record to indicate that defendant 
was not consulted during the trial regarding the court's response 
to this initial jury question,5 defendant has waived this 
Court's review of that issue. 
While defendant's objection to the court's 
interpretation, i.e., that section 76-5-202(1)(b) does not 
require that the actor commit both murders, preserved that issue 
for appeal, it was insufficient to preserve what defendant now 
argues on appeal, that on account of the trial court's response 
to the second inquiry the jury need not have found that the 
homicide was committed incident to any of the four alternative 
circumstances set forth in the statute. Even if the issue were 
preserved, the meaning defendant suggests the jury might have 
garnered from the trial court's response is absurd, i.e., that 
none of the four incidental circumstances (one act, scheme, 
course of conduct or criminal episode) should be considered and 
that they merely need find that two killings occurred. Such a 
reading is a simple denial of the plain language requirements of 
the statute and the instruction. 
In State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 
1057, 102 S. Ct. 606 (1981), the defendant argued in a 
suppression hearing that the initial viewing of stolen goods in a 
5
 The prosecutor specifically stated, w[W]e would ask for 
further instruction if there is another question on the same 
issue" (T. 1,407). From this statement it can be reasonably 
inferred that since no further discussions on this issue appear 
of record, none occurred. 
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truck was an unlawful search. On appeal, the defendant made the 
additional, somewhat related argument, that regardless of the 
lawfulness of the search, the seizure was itself unlawful. This 
Court declined to review the unlawful seizure claim, indicating 
that the defendant bore the burden of presenting "all available 
grounds in support of a motion to suppress" and that such motions 
"should be supported by precise averments." id. at 53. This 
Court further concluded: 
There is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the point now urged upon this 
Court was unavailable or unknown to defendant 
at the time he filed his motion to suppress, 
and to entertain the point now would be to 
sanction the practice of withholding 
arguments that should properly be presented 
to the trial court for the purpose of seeking 
a reversal on appeal and a new trial or 
dismissal. 
Ibid. Accord State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 600-01 (Utah 1985) 
(refusing to consider a claim of warrantless search of a backpack 
where only an unlawful stop and frisk were argued at a 
suppression hearing). Because defendant failed to preserve his 
objection to the trial court's response to the second jury 
inquiry, this Court should decline to address his argument on 
appeal. 
D. Defendant Either Omitted or Only 
Nominally Alluded to Claims Made 
on Appeal that Section 76-3-203.1 
is Unconstitutional and Creates a 
New Crime. 
On appeal defendant makes a barrage of challenges to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992), commonly referred to as 
the "gang enhancement," under both the Utah and United States 
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Constitutions, Specifically, he first claims that section 7 6- 3 -
?01 | is iiji'i n!>,I i I ut i hi - 1 1 II |, i ' I ' l i h l II' in ir i :piiiieriesi: because Mi*1 po i soni 
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exercise of first amendment rights (Appellant " i» Brief at Point 
, i i, at 41-'IB). Second, defendant claims the statute violates 
due process because i L makes criminal detendaiiLs accountable tor 
the acts of others who may be uncharged on* unconvicted of any 
offenses (Appellant "' r. BnU f -"PI point < ', III- ill « I R ' 4 r H i , Ill'lli oil, 
defendant claims the statute denies a detendanl the right Lo a 
puny trial under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
b e r v i n s t " in I I-'i»!i iiF-if:»iri t, i, f-ji T 1 y i l o t i n o * i ini -"i • » i ' r i IIII •' II11t l i i i- n I loijitpjn,;; II 
to I ind ings heyund r i .sasonable dotibl ( P i n i \ i'" a t 50-52 ) . 
In c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to h i s Jeni-jthy and d e t a i l e d 
m u l l in I i 1 I M I i. J I il  II il 11-" 11 II \ i II II H p p t i Y J ll j i l l " ! i - i n i n 11 1 II in t " ' ( | I I • ! f Jl IM h l ' l I J i i | | 
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S t r . K * ^*: \- n g E n h a n c e m e n t , R, J?!"), a t t a c h e d a t A d d e n d u m s-
T L c x c x& n o m e m o r a n d u m i n s u p p o r t of M i l s moti i iun iiiiiii MM-1 irei' 
nor was t h e r e any argument oi: C i t a t i o n to a u t h o r i t y a t the 
s en t enc ing hea r ing .where defendant again made a gene ra l o b j e c t i o n 
23 
to the enhancement. At that hearing defendant merely asserted, 
"[w]ith respect to the enhancement—gang enhancement. . . . I 
think that I need to perfect the record in behalf of Mr. Alvarez 
in that regard. There are Constitutional arguments thatneed 
[sic] to be preserved regarding vagueness in the relegation of 
legislative function to the Judicial and Executive branches and 
applying Federal standards 76-3-203.1, Federal and State 
constitutional standards 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional." (T. 
1,422). Defendant's other references to the sentencing 
enhancement bear only on his complaint that the circuit court 
judge failed to make findings of fact showing that others had 
participated with defendant, in effect an insufficiency of 
evidence claim directed at the preliminary hearing level (T. of 
Nov. 5, 1990 hearing, R. 376 at 4-7). None of defendant's 
remarks on this point bear on the federal and state 
constitutional and statutory arguments defendant raises on 
appeal. 
An almost identical general objection was held a waiver in 
Elm, 808 P.2d at 1099-1100. In Elm, the objection was: "Your 
Honor, just for the purpose of the record, may we express our 
objection to the sentencing so we may be able to preserve that 
for purposes of appeal?" Id. at 1100. This Court found that the 
defendant had waived any specific claims of defects to the 
sentencing on the ground that counsel's general objection was 
inadequate. Ibid. 
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 Only defendant's claim that the trial court's findings 
that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons under 
section 76-3-203.1 is properly before this Court on appeal 
(Appellant's Brief at: 52-55) That i ssi :ie i s addressed at Point 
IV of this brief. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
THAT THE STATE USED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO 
STRIKE TWO HISPANIC JURORS FOR OTHER THAN 
RACE NEUTRAL REASONS; EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE 
TO FIND THAT A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAD BEEN 
MADE, IT WOULD FIND THE STATE'S REASONS 
ADEQUATE. 
Following voir dire of the jury and prior to the 
swearing of the panel, defendantf a Hispanic, challenged the 
panel on the ground the State used its peremptory challenges to 
strike two Hispanic jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 
(Utah 1989) ("Cantu II'M, and State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 
1991) (Appellant's Brief, Point II at 22; T. 515-17). 
A. The Prima Facie Case Standards. 
In Batson. the United States Supreme Court ruled it an 
equal protection violation for a prosecutor to use a peremptory 
challenge to exclude prospective jury members solely on the basis 
of race. Id., at 79. Since Batson, this Court has modified the 
showing required of a defendant to initially attack a peremptory 
challenge allegedly made in violation of his fourteenth amendment 
rights; 
The party attacking a peremptory challenge 
must establish a prima facie case. rCantu I, 
750 P.2d at 595] (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986)). 
The elements necessary to such a prima facie 
case include (1) as complete a record as 
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possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded 
belong to a cognizable group under the 
representative cross-section rule,7 and (3) 
a showing that there exists ra strong 
likelihood that such persons are being 
challenged because of their group association 
rather than because of any specific bias.' 
People v, Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 280, 281, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748, 764 
(1978) . 
Cantu 1 I , " ; I! at fj. I Fl (citations om.i1 foil) (emphasis added) The 
Court also set. out the pattern ut shifting burdens, uleni i 
Batsor 4 76 ILLS "ILM! n IB, to be followed by the parties i n 
p - - i, i in 'fji i Bat son r 11 -in III! Il e n q e : 
[Once the party attacking a peremptory-
challenge has established a prima facie 
case,] [t]he burden then shifts to the 
challenged party to show the existence of a 
racially neutral reason for the challenge. 
Id. at 595. A determination as to whether 
the evidence rebuts the prima facie case 
generally turns on evaluation of witness 
credibility. United States v. David, 844 
F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1988). 
Id. at 518. 
7
 In Span ,• this Court clari fied the standard for assessing 
"cognizability" for equal protection purposes, which had been 
left somewhat confused by citation in State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d. 
591 P.2d (Utah 1988) ("Cantu I"\. to cases relying on different 
constitutional bases in characterizing "cognizability." See 
Span, 819 P.2d at 340-342. In selecting the analysis adopted In 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977), wh iii ch 
was specifically cited Batson, this Court clearly rejected the 
representative cross-section analysis advanced by People v. 
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), and People v. Fields, 732 P 2d 
1145 (Colo. 1987), for equal protection purposes. Thus, m\ m 1 
seem that the phrase, "a cognizable group under the 
representative cross-section rule," as it appears in Cantu II at 
518, should be replaced by the term "any group that is a 
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treat mi : 
under the laws, as written or as applied," the definition 
announced in Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494, and adopted by this 
Court i n Span
 r 819 P.2d at 341. 
A number of courts have determined a prima facie case 
to be a necessary threshold showing before the burden shifts to 
the government to explain its race neutral reasons for using its 
peremptory strikes in the allegedly discriminatory fashion. In 
United States v. Youhq-Bev, 893 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1990), the 
court found that the government's striking of two blacks from the 
panel, without a further showing that the use of the peremptories 
gave rise to an inference that the prospective jurors were struck 
because of their race, was insufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination under Batson, "and that the 
government was thus not required to state its reasons for 
peremptorily challenging the two black venirepersons." id. at 
181. In United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 215 (1992) focussing on the shifting 
burdens scheme laid out in Batson, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's holding that the government was not required 
to come forward with race-neutral reasons where the defendant had 
failed to establish a prima facie case based only on the 
government's using four of its eight peremptory strikes against 
blacks. The Court noted: "The purpose of the prima facie case 
requirement is to separate meritless claims of discrimination 
from those that may have merit." JEd. at 334 (citing Texas Dept. 
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54, 101 S. Ct. 
189, 1093-94 (1981)8. See also Hansel v. Public Service Co. of 
8
 Batson expressly identified Title VII case law as a source 
for "prima facie burden of proof rules" to be applied to the 
analysis of peremptory juror challenges, see 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, 
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Colorado, 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding in a 
Title VII case that if the plaintiff could not prove the prima 
facie elements of job discrimination, then the burden of proof 
did not shift to the defendant to show legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for allegedly differential treatment). 
In this case the jury venire consisted of seventy-seven 
persons. Fourteen were excused for cause, and both defendant and 
the State exercised twelve peremptory challenges (R. 223-26). 
Four of the venirepersons had Hispanic surnames. There was also 
a venireperson, Joan Anderson, juror #42, who appeared Hispanic 
to defendant and whom defendant struck with his eighth peremptory 
challenge (R. 225; T. 521). The trial court struck Madalyn 
Ramos, juror #10, for cause (R. 223). Of the remaining three 
jurors with Hispanic surnames, the prosecutor struck two, Annie 
Sanchez, juror #46, and Wendy Mayeda, juror #21, with his first 
and fifth peremptory challenge, respectively. 
At trial, defendant, failing to recall that he had also 
removed an alleged Hispanic, charged the prosecution with a 
Batson violation solely on account of its removal of two out of 
three Hispanics from the panel (T. 515-16). When asked by the 
trial court as to whether the challenged jurors were, in fact, 
Hispanic, defendant answered, "She [Wendy Mayeda] appears to be 
Hispanic and has a Hispanic name. That's all I can do" (T. 519) 
a fact noted in State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App. 
1991). 
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(emphasis added).9 On appeal, defendant urges that this Court 
find that he established a prima facie case on nothing more than 
his assertion that the prosecutor struck 67 percent of the 
potential Hispanic jurors and that the minority jurors stricken 
were of the same race as he (Appellant's Brief at 24-25). Such a 
limited showing by a Batson proponent is not sufficient to make a 
prima facie case through either "a showing that persons excluded 
belong to a cognizable group," or "that there exists 'a strong 
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of 
their group association rather than because of any specific 
bias.'" Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (Appellee's Brief at 26-27). 
B. Cognizabilitv of Excluded Jurors. 
"The burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination lies with the defendant." Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 
595. The first requirement of the prima facie case is to bring 
forward as complete a record as possible. Cantu II. 778 P.2d at 
518. 
In this case defendant never established that Sanchez 
and Mayeda were, in fact, Hispanics. During the course of the 
proceedings, the trial court discussed the difficulty of applying 
the Batson challenge when the ancestry, and consequently the 
group affiliation, of the excluded jurors had not been 
established (T. 518-19). The validity of this inquiry was made 
more apparent when defendant acknowledged that he had excluded 
9
 The complete colloquy amongst the trial court and the 
parties is attached at Addendum H. 
30 
Anderson, juror #42, who appeared Hispanic to him, but neither 
he, the prosecutor nor the trial court could agree that she was 
Hispanic, based on appearance (T. 518). Defendant never asked to 
recall the excluded jurors to determine with certainty their 
group affiliation, in spite of his having anticipated bringing a 
Batson challenge the day before the parties exercised their 
peremptories and in spite of the entire panel's still being 
available when the challenge was made the following day (T. 488-
93, 513-14). Contrary to defendant's assertion (Appellant's 
Brief at 24 n.15), neither the trial court nor the prosecutor 
ever acknowledged that Sanchez and Mayeda were actually 
Hispanics, but rather proceeded as though they were in deference 
to defendant's challenge (T. 519-23). 
In United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 
1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. (1992), the court found the 
defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case under 
Batson, where the prosecution had used four of its six peremptory 
challenges and its one challenge against an alternate juror to 
strike Hispanic members of the panel. A central component of the 
court's finding was defendant's failure "to establish with 
certainty the racial identity of the venire members struck by the 
prosecution." Ld. at 1466. The court noted that while 
appearance and surnames may provide a plausible inference as to 
group identity, it could not sustain a Batson challenge on 
conjecture. Ibid. Further, the court distinguished Castaneda, 
relied on for the proposition that "all persons of Spanish 
31 
language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans . . . ," 
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 486, noting that in Castaneda, the Court 
"had relied on official census categorizations rather than 
counsel's surmises about names and their racial significance." 
Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1467. 
In Span, the Court stated: "Under any legitimate 
theory asserted by a defendant that a prosecutor has 
unconstitutionally discriminated in the use of a peremptory 
challenge, a defendant must demonstrate that the excluded 
prospective juror was a member of a cognizable minority group." 
819 P.2d at 340 (emphasis added). But see Harrison, 805 P.2d at 
777 n.9 (recognizing that while minority status cannot be 
established solely from one's surname, "concrete proof of the 
actual race of the jurors so challenged is, at most, of secondary 
importance"). 
Further, this case is distinguishable from both 
Cantu I, where two justices of this Court found that a prima 
facie case was made, and Harrison, where the court of appeals 
also found that a prima facie case had been made. In Cantu I, 
the excluded juror acknowledged that he was of Hispanic ancestry, 
750 P.2d at 596, and in Harrison, the trial court observed that 
the jurors in question appeared to be members of racial 
minorities. 805 P.2d at 777. No such showing of racial identity 
was made in this case. 
In Wheeler, a pre-Batson case cited by this Court for 
the appropriate prima facie test, the defendant, apparently 
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recognizing that the prosecution was using every one of its 
peremptory challenges to strike black members of the panel, 
established a record of each black panel member's racial identity 
as soon as he became aware of the pattern of prosecution strikes. 
The court stated that "when an issue of this nature does arise in 
any case it is incumbent upon counsel, however delicate the 
matter, to make a record sufficient to preserve the point for 
review." 583 P.2d at 752 (emphasis added). As noted above, 
defendant failed to undertake the simple exercise of having the 
excluded jurors recalled to determine the precise character of 
their racial identity and thereby failed to establish a prima 
facie case of cognizability. 
Integrally related to making a secure determination of 
the excluded jurors racial identity, is the second element of the 
Cantu II test, that such persons be members of a "cognizable 
group." While Cantu I and Harrison would appear to have settled 
that Hispanics do comprise such a group, this Court's decision in 
Span suggests that the matter is not finally determined. In 
clarifying the term, "cognizability," Span nonetheless did not 
reject Tillman's citation to Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 
479, 74 S. Ct. 667, 671 (1954), where the United States Supreme 
Court noted that whether [Hispanics] did in fact exist as a 
distinct group was a question of fact in any given community. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575 n.125. Thus, whether Hispanics are, in 
fact, such a "cognizable group" in Salt Lake City would still 
appear to be an open question. 
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The trial court never made a finding on whether 
Hispanics in Salt Lake City are a "cognizable group," first, 
because it was uncertain that the excluded panel members belonged 
to such a group, and second, because it obviously did not think 
the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes, based on the 
resultant representation of presumed Hispanics on the jury, was 
discriminatory (T. 518-22). In this case defendant had an 
opportunity to demonstrate both the group affiliation of the 
excluded jurors and the cognizability of Hispanics within the 
community. He failed to do either. Thus, unlike the defendant 
in Span, who was deprived of an opportunity to show that an 
individual who appeared to be Vietnamese belonged to a cognizable 
group because of the trial court's erroneous ruling that his 
Batson challenge was untimely, defendant in this case should not 
be permitted to return to the trial court to establish a prima 
facie case. 
C. Defendant Failed to Show a "Strong 
Likelihood" that Aligned Minority 
Jurors were Struck from the Panel 
Because of Their Group Association 
Rather than Because of any Specific 
Bias. 
In Batson, the Court identified several avenues by 
which a prima facie case might be made, one of which was the 
showing of a "pattern" of strikes against the minority jurors in 
the venire. J[d. at 97. 
"While a single challenge based on race is 
impermissible, the mere fact that the subject of the peremptory 
strike is a minority member does not alone raise the inference of 
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discriminatory intent. '[I]t is not unconstitutional, without 
more, to strike one or more [Hispanics] from the jury.'" 
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597 (citations omitted). In order to make a 
prima facie case, "[t]he facts and circumstances surrounding the 
use of the challenge must raise the inference that the 
prosecution used the peremptory challenges to exclude a person 
from the petit jury on account of his or her race," Ibid. 
In this case defendant relied only on the bare fact 
that the prosecution struck two out of four alleged Hispanic 
jurors, i.e., fifty percent. In Malindez, the court found that 
the prosecution's striking the same percentage, without an offer 
by the defendant of any other evidence in support of a prima 
facie case, was insufficient to support a Batson challenge. 
Malindez, 962 F.2d. at 333 n.3. In United States v. Brown, 941 
F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1991), the court summarily struck down a 
Batson challenge, stating: "While numbers may be important, '<a 
defendant who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful 
discrimination is obligated to develop Tsomel record, beyond 
numbers, in support of the asserted violation.'" .Ici. at 659 
(emphasis added). In Ross v. State, 406 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. App. 
1991), the court found the defendant had not made a prima facie 
case where the proportion of blacks on the selected jury was 
identical to that on the panel, even though the State had used 
peremptory strikes to disqualify five of the seven black members 
of the jury panel. In this case the panel consisted of seventy-
seven persons, four (and possibly five) of whom were Hispanic, 
35 
i.e., between approximately five and six percent of the venire. 
Following the parties' peremptory strikes, approximately eight 
percent of the jury consisted of Hispanics, an even higher 
percentage than that of the original venire. 
Furthermore, the Batson proponent, having the ultimate 
burden of persuasion, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18, has the 
burden to develop a sufficient record in the trial court. In 
this case defendant admitted that he could do nothing more than 
show that the excluded jurors had Hispanic surnames and that they 
appeared, to him, to be Hispanic (T. 519). In Young-Bey, the 
Fourth Circuit stated: "Batson quite clearly requires the 
defendant to present facts to the district court which raise an 
inference that the blacks were struck because of their race.•• 
Ibid, (italics in original). In rejecting the defendant's 
challenge, the court noted that no such facts were presented to 
the district court. Ibid. 
Following defendant's challenge, based only on the 
prosecution's removal of the two alleged Hispanic jurors, the 
colloquy continued: 
MR. MORGAN [Prosecutor]: We're mumbling 
through the first part. Where have I 
systematically excluded? I have taken two 
out of three. 
Your Honor, make a finding that that's 
systematic exclusion or not. 
THE COURT: I don't think it is. 
(T. 521) (emphasis added). Thus, before the prosecutor 
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voluntarily offered his race-neutral reasons for striking Mayeda 
and Sanchez, the trial court had made a finding that the 
prosecution's peremptory strikes had not been made with 
discriminatory intent. 
On appeal, this Court should give great deference to 
the trial court's factual finding that defendant failed to 
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under 
Batson. United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S. Ct. 304 (1988); Cantu II, 778 
P.2d at 520 (Hall, C.J., dissenting). 
"Findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly 
erroneous." Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a)). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-
93 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). 
In Walker, this Court further clarified the standard of 
review by referring to Wright and Miller as follows: 
The appellate court . . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
Id. at 193 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 2585 (1971)). Thus, this Court will only set aside 
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a trial court's findings when they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if the court otherwise reaches a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 
In this case the trial court was required to determine 
whether, as a result of the prosecutor's exercising two of his 
peremptory strikes, defendant had made a prima facie case of race 
discrimination by showing there existed a strong likelihood that 
alleged Hispanic venirepersons were excluded from the jury solely 
on account of race. Defendant put before the court no other 
facts than that the prosecution struck two of four such persons. 
On the basis of those facts, the trial court's finding that the 
two jurors had not been struck on account of their race cannot be 
regarded as clearly erroneous. 
D. Even if Defendant did Make a 
Prima Facie Case, the Prosecution 
Offered Satisfactory Race-Neutral 
Reasons for Striking the Prospective 
Jurors. 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his burden of 
establishing an inference of bias, the burden then shifted to the 
prosecution to provide a credible race neutral explanation for 
the peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Cantu II, 778 
P.2d at 518. The explanation cannot be a mere denial of 
discriminatory intent; however, it need not rise to the level of 
a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98. Rather, a 
prosecutor's explanation must be "(1) neutral, (2) related to the 
case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
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legitimate." Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted). 
After it had ruled that defendant had failed to show 
that the prosecutor had exercised his peremptory strikes in a 
discriminatory manner, the trial court suggested that the 
prosecutor make a record of his race-neutral reasons for striking 
the challenged jurors (T. 522). With respect to Wendy Mayeda, 
the prosecutor stated: 
The prosecutor's neutral non-race reasons 
are as follows: Wendy Mayeda, the State took 
off, Juror No. 21, for the following reasons: 
She's youthful, she indicated she would be 
suffering a financial hardship and she also 
indicated she has personal problems and would 
have difficulty in concentrating, and that 
she's going through a separation, even though 
she is not married at the time. She also 
indicated that although she would follow the 
Court's instructions with regard to the death 
penalty, that she had some scruples over the 
death penalty. For those reasons, the State 
elected its pre-emptory [sic] challenge and 
removed Wendy Mayeda from the panel. 
(T. 524). 
In challenging the validity of the prosecutor's 
reasons, defendant relies on a list of factors that may cast 
doubt upon the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral 
explanation: 
. . . (1) alleged group bias not shown to be 
shared by the juror in question, (2) failure 
to examine the juror or perfunctory 
examination, assuming neither the trial court 
nor opposing counsel had questioned the 
juror, (3) singling the juror out for special 
questioning designed to evoke a certain 
response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is 
unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a 
challenge based on reasons equally applicable 
to juror [sic] who were not challenged. 
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Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citing State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 
22 (Fla.), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S. Ct. 2873 (1988)). 
1. Wendy Maveda. 
Specifically, defendant claims the prosecutor 
discriminatorily struck Mayeda because two of the reasons he 
asserted, i.e., that she was youthful (25 years old), and had 
expressed scruples about applying the death penalty, could be 
applied equally to other jurors against whom he had not exercised 
his peremptory challenges (Appellant's Brief at 27-30). Further, 
defendant argues, the prosecutor's alleged concern with Mayeda's 
expression of concern about being able to concentrate on the 
trial because she was going through a separation should have been 
allayed when the trial court elicited from Mayeda that she would 
nonetheless try to apply her attention to the case (Appellant's 
Brief at 28). Finally, defendant argues that there is no support 
in the record for the prosecutor's reason for striking Mayeda on 
account of financial hardship (Appellant's Brief at 30). With 
the exception of this last point, which is trivial and quite 
understandable in the context of Mayeda's expressed concerns 
about serving on the jury, defendant's points are insufficient to 
demonstrate a discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge on 
this juror. 
The prosecutor may ordinarily exercise peremptory 
challenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is 
related to his view concerning the outcome" of the case. Batson, 
476 U.S. at 89 (citations omitted). 
40 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor's nonuse of 
peremptory strikes against Stacy Korth, age 24, and Christine 
Albrycht, age 28, demonstrated a racial bias in striking Mayeda. 
However, jury selection is not based on single criteria, but 
rather on a host of characteristics manifested by the prospective 
jurors. State v. Thomas, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (N.C. 1991) (noting 
that jury selection is "more an art than a science" and in which 
"[r]arely will a single factor control the decision-making 
process"). Defendant neglects to mention that Korth presented 
herself as an especially mature individual for a 24-year old, 
i.e., a married woman, working as a registered nurse on child 
abuse cases (T. 27, 55). Similarly, Christine Albrycht, age 28, 
had three years of college and was working as a product 
development analyst at a major corporation (T. 28). Also, 
neither of these jurors expressed any concern about the 
imposition of the death penalty, as did Mayeda (T. 337-42, 374-
80). In fact, following the voir dire on the imposition of the 
death penalty, the trial court remarked about Albrycht, "Very 
forthright. That's the kind of person that makes an excellent 
juror" (T. 380). 
There is no question that Mayeda presented a 
significant basis for exclusion when she expressed some doubts 
about being able to concentrate because she was then going 
through a separation. Defendant points to no other juror that 
was similarly preoccupied. Mayeda clearly stated that she was 
having "a really hard time with trying to deal with all that" (T. 
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236 ).10 That she said she would "try" to apply her best efforts 
to the case, in response to the trial court's pressing question, 
does not negate the prosecutor's legitimate doubts, even if her 
concerns did not give rise to a challenge for cause. See United 
States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding 
the government's strike against a young single mother who "might 
have other concerns" an adequate race-neutral reason for striking 
a black juror). 
The issues of age and mental presence, however, pale 
alongside the central concern in the case—the death penalty. 
The examination on the prospective jurors' attitudes on this 
issue comprises almost the entire voir dire, i.e., approximately 
four hundred out of a total of five hundred pages (see Vols. I-
III of the transcript). Defendant suggests that because 
prospective jurors Georgina Carr, Robert Galvez and Darla 
Chedester expressed "some degree of concern over the death 
penalty," but were not removed, the prosecutor's reasons for 
striking Mayeda were not race-neutral. The facts are otherwise. 
First, none of the mentioned jurors expressed nearly 
the same concern over the imposition of the death penalty that 
Mayeda did.11 Car, clearly stated that her somewhat mixed 
feelings would not stop her from imposing the penalty if she were 
convinced that it was the only appropriate penalty (T. 265-66). 
10
 The voir dire of Mayeda is attached at Addendum I. 
11
 The voir dire of jurors Carr, Galvez and Chedester are 
attached at Addenda J, K and L, respectively. 
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Galvez indicated that he had "some feelings" about the imposition 
of the penalty, but that it should be imposed for "mass murders" 
(T. 280). The prosecutor, generally leaving the voir dire in the 
trial court's hands, specifically asked Galvez if the death 
penalty would be appropriate in the case of a double homicide. 
Galvez answered that he could apply the penalty in such a case if 
he were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 284). Chedester, 
though she expressed some concern about imposing the penalty, 
clearly indicated that she would be willing to apply it if she 
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt about its 
appropriateness (T. 296-305). 
Mayeda, on the other hand, was far more reluctant to 
apply the death penalty than either Carr, Galvez or Chedester. 
At the very outset she stated, "I just feel I don't have any 
right to really judge or to really say if this person should be 
allowed to die or live" (T. 239). When asked by the trial court 
if she could impose the penalty if it were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances, she responded, "I don't know even 
if I were convinced I could still—you know—I just—even if I 
was convinced, it's still hard for me to say yes, this is what— 
this is the alternative for this person, I mean" (T. 240). When 
pressed again, she responded, "I don't think so" (T. 241). Only 
after the trial court impressed on her that it would be her duty 
to follow the court's instructions, which would include the 
responsibility to impose the penalty if she were convinced beyond 
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a reasonable doubt did she acquiesce, "Yes, because I have to 
follow the law. Doesn't leave me much choice" (T. 243). 
Further, defendant admitted even before he made his 
Batson challenge that "21 [Mayeda] was so soft on the death 
penalty, I think you could take her off with a pre-emptory [sic] 
challenge . . . " (T. 489-90)- Lastly, when the prosecutor did 
tender his race-neutral reasons, defendant stated, "Well, and I'm 
not going to respond to 21 [Mayeda]" (T. 525). In sum, the 
prosecutor's reasons for striking Mayeda were obviously race-
neutral, related to the case, clear and legitimate. See Thomas, 
407 S.E.2d at 146-48 (finding a juror's never having thought 
about the death penalty an adequate race-neutral reason for 
striking him). 
Defendant correctly points out that the prosecutor also 
stated that he struck Mayeda because she said she would suffer 
financial hardship if she sat on the jury, a fact not in the 
record. However, the prosecutor's assertion is a fairly 
reasonable unconscious surmise about the juror's probable 
financial status in the midst of a domestic breakup. In any 
event, in the face of the obvious fact that Mayeda was young, 
distracted by a separation and clearly opposed to the death 
penalty, this error can only be regarded as trivial. 
The trial court did not make findings of fact following 
the tender of the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons, but 
proceeded directly to announce the jury selection to the panel 
(T. 524-26). However, whenever it would be reasonable to assume 
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that the court actually made such findings based on the competent 
evidence in the record and the facts are Mclear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of [the trial 
court's] judgment,,f the appellate court may review the facts 
without remanding to the lower court.12 State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991). 
Here, the trial court's and the prosecutor's voir dire 
elicited the very reasons about which the prosecutor subsequently 
expressed concern. See Cantu fill, 778 P.2d at 519 (prosecutor's 
voir dire requests relevant to a determination of his 
explanation). The prosecutor's explanations were consistent with 
his questioning and consistent with the answers given. The 
reason, potential bias, is a traditional and legitimate basis for 
exercising a challenge. Cf.. Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (juror's bias is 
a basis for removal for cause). The credibility of the 
prosecutor was further enhanced when he recognized that Mayeda's 
responses did not justify her removal for cause, or render her a 
12
 An appellate court is only permitted to enter its own 
factual findings where the facts are not in dispute and are 
discernible from the record. Here, the prosecutor may have had 
additional reasons for striking the potential jurors not 
reflected in the record such as a juror's demeanor, apparent 
unwillingness to serve as a juror, mental alertness, and ability 
to concentrate on the proceedings. It is because of the 
unrecordable nature of many legitimate reasons for exercising a 
peremptory challenge that a trial court is generally in the best 
position to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor's 
explanations. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. If 
the prosecutor's record explanation is determined not to be 
sufficient to rebut any prima facie case, this Court would be 
obligated to remand to the trial court for it to determine the 
race-neutrality of any other explanations which may be offered. 
Span, 819 P.2d at 343; Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. 
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"bad" juror, but were simply relevant race-neutral facts 
particular to her as opposed to other members of the panel. 
Since the reasons expressed for exclusion were both race-neutral 
and legitimate, there is no basis from which to conclude that 
race was a factor in the 
prosecutor's challenges of Mayeda. 
2. Annie Sanchez. 
The prosecutor explained his reasons for striking 
Sanchez as follows: 
With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No, 
46, the State pre-empted [sic] her for the 
following neutral, non-racial reasons. She 
is youthful, she's 21 years old. She seemed 
to identify with the defendant during the 
course of the jury voir dire. She was 
constantly looking at him. She also 
indicated that she had scruples against the 
death penalty, even though she would follow, 
she had to be talked to quite a bit in 
comparison to the rest of the jurors, about 
her ability to pass on the death penalty; 
therefore, for those reasons, the State pre-
empted [sic] Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, 
using its first pre-emptory [sic] challenge. 
(T. 524-25). 
Defendant took issue with one of the prosecutor's 
reasons: 
MR. VAN SCIVER [Defense Counsel]: All right. 
Seemed to identify with the defendant is the 
very basis why his pre-emptory [sic] and it's 
his first one. 
MR. MORGAN [Prosecutor]: Good point. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: It's race oriented. 
MR. MORGAN: Good point. Like to clarify 
that. Seemed to identify based upon her 
youth, based on her eye contact with him and 
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based on her friendliness toward the 
defendant. Not that she identified in the 
sense they were from the same culture. 
(T. 525). 
At the close of the trial court's voir dire of Sanchez 
on the death penalty, the prosecutor, apparently recognizing at 
that point Sanchez's friendliness towards defendant, engaged in 
the following brief colloquy: 
MR. MORGAN: One question. Mrs. Sanchez, 
you're 21? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
MR. MORGAN: You think you can take a look at 
this case, and evidence, and put aside any 
feelings of sympathy vou may have? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
MR. MORGAN: The fact the defendant is very 
young, is that going to bother you? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
MR. MORGAN: Thank you. 
(T. 413) (emphasis added).13 
A prosecutor is entitled to rely on his "hunches" and 
his past experience in making his race-neutral peremptory 
strikes. Hernandez v. State, 808 S.W.2d 536, 543 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1991) (finding that the prosecution's race-neutral reason 
for striking a female Hispanic juror on the ground that the juror 
might be attracted to the defendant or his counsel was not 
clearly erroneous). In this case the prosecutor detected an 
apparent favoritism that, by its nature, does not come through 
13
 The voir dire of Sanchez is attached at Addendum M. 
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the dry, printed record. As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained, "In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the 
decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral 
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There 
will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best 
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises 
the challenge. . . . [E]valuation of the prosecutor's state of 
mind based on demeanor and credibility lies peculiarly within a 
trial judge's province." Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 
1869 (1991). As noted above, the trial court did not make 
findings following the prosecutor's tender of his reasons and 
defendant's brief challenge. It would appear that the court 
found the reasons adequate and that they only confirmed its 
earlier ruling, that the prosecutor had not engaged in 
"systematic exclusion" of the alleged minority jurors (T. 525). 
Defendant is correct, however, that the prosecutor's 
evaluation of Sanchez's response to the death-qualifying voir 
dire is not supported by the record (Appellant's Brief at 32). 
While an unsupported statement on a major issue would appear to 
be a illegitimate reason in support of a race-neutral explanation 
for the use of a peremptory strike, the prosecutor's approach to 
defendant's Batson challenge suggests otherwise. At the moment 
the trial court made its ruling that the prosecution strikes did 
not evidence a discriminatory pattern, it was unnecessary for the 
prosecution to have proceeded further. Yet, he willingly 
tendered those reasons. It is unreasonable to believe that a 
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capable prosecutor, such as Mr. Morgan, would have intentionally 
offered a clearly inaccurate statement, knowing that all 
defendant or the trial court would have to have done to disarm 
his argument was to recall what Sanchez's testimony actually was. 
The most reasonable Explanation for the prosecutor's inaccurate 
statement was that it was a mistake. 
If this Court were to regard the above-referenced 
discrepancy as significant, considering the otherwise cogent 
character of the prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory 
strikes against both Mayeda and Sanchez, the proper remedy would 
be to remand the case back to the district court to permit the 
prosecutor a fuller opportunity to rebut any inference that his 
peremptory strike against Sanchez was discriminatorily made. See 
Span, 819 P.2d at 342-43 (ordering remand even where the 
prosecutor asked a stricken Vietnamese juror no questions during 
voir dire and articulated only a vague reason not related to the 
facts of the case for striking him). If on remand the trial 
court finds the exclusion was not based on discriminatory intent, 
then the conviction should be affirmed. If, instead, the court 
finds that the challenge was racially motivated, then a new trial 
must be ordered. Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597.1A 
14
 In ordering previous remands, this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court have instructed the lower courts that if they 
determined that no race-neutral explanation existed justifying 
the peremptory challenge, the courts were then to determine if 
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Cantu m , 750 P.2d at 597; Harrison, 805 P.2d at 780 (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S, 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 
(1967)). Only Utah and the Military Justice Court have applied a 
harmless error analysis to discriminatory strikes. Id.; United 
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In sum, however, such discrepancy fails to satisfy 
defendant's ultimate burden of persuasion in demonstrating that 
Sanchez was struck on account of being an alleged Hispanic. 
Batson does not preclude the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges; it "forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential 
jurors solely on account of their race . . . ." id. at 89 
(emphasis added). In this case the prosecutor rarely interrupted 
the trial court in its voir dire on the death-qualification 
issue. However, the prosecutor clearly detected something in the 
course of Sanchez's seemingly acceptable responses that betrayed 
a bias in favor of defendant. He expressed that concern, long 
before defendant made his Batson challenge, in his follow-up 
inquiries concerning Sanchez's feelings of sympathy because of 
defendant's youth. Later, in explaining his race-neutral reasons 
for striking Sanchez, the prosecutor noted that Sanchez was 
constantly looking at defendant and making eye contact, behavior 
States v. Cooper, 28 M.J. 810 (ACMR 1989). All other courts have 
concluded that the racially discriminatory use of a peremptory 
strike may never be harmless. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 
1093, 1099 (1992) (J. Blackmun, concurring) (harmless-error 
analysis is inapplicable to certain categories of constitutional 
error such as racial discrimination in jury selection); Gomez v. 
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 2247-48 (1989) (government 
concedes that no harmless-error analysis is applicable to Batson-
type violations); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 
(10th Cir. 1987) (new trial mandated if government fails to 
articulate a race-neutral explanation); Andrews v. Barnes, 743 
F.Supp. 1496, 1508-09 (D. Utah 1990) ("[e]qual protection claims 
in the jury selection process may not be defeated by a contention 
of absence of prejudice"); People v. Harris, 537 N.E.2d 977, 980 
(111. App. 1989) (new trial is mandated if peremptory challenges 
were exercised for a racially discriminatory purpose). 
Controlling federal case law dictates that if the trial court 
finds a Batson violation, a new trial would be required. 
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which, in his opinion, betrayed friendly feelings. Obviously, 
the record on appeal cannot reveal the gestures and demeanor of 
prospective jurors. However, considering that the prosecutor 
signalled his concern about Sanchez on a race-neutral issue 
before the Batson challenge ever appeared, and considering that 
the trial court implicitly accepted the prosecutor's reason by 
simply proceeding with the trial without comment, this court 
should assume that the trial court found the prosecutor's 
reasons, in sum, credible, the ultimate test under Batson. 
Furthermore, defendant's implicit argument that both 
Mayeda and Sanchez were struck because the prosecutor believed 
they would be biased in favor of a Hispanic defendant is 
undermined by the fact that the State's principal witnesses, 
Salas, Velasquez and Rivas, were also Hispanic. Against this 
backdrop, it would make no sense for the prosecution to try to 
strike Hispanic jurors. The United States Supreme Court has 
employed precisely this reasoning in Hernandez. There the Court 
recognized that the fact that many of the prosecution's witnesses 
and victims were Latino "tended to undercut any motive to exclude 
Latinos from the jury." Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct at 
1872. The Court also held that this factor "could be taken as 
evidence of the prosecutor's sincerity" in giving race-neutral 
reasons for striking alleged Hispanics. Ibid. This Court should 
also rely on this factor as one more reason why the prosecutor's 
strikes were not racially based. On the basis of all of the 
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foregoing, this Court should hold that the trial court's implied 
acceptance of the prosecutor's reasons was not clearly erroneous, 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE TWO HOMICIDES WERE COMMITTED INCIDENT TO 
A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
"In considering [whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. [The 
appellate court] reverse[s] a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). 
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990), which, as 
defendant was charged, provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the first degree if the actor intentionally 
or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
(b) The homicide was committed incident 
to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or 
criminal episode during which two or more 
persons are killed. 
At the very least there was sufficient evidence to 
prove that defendant was criminally liable for a homicide 
incident to the principal homicide for which he was convicted, 
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both homicides occuring in the course of a single criminal 
episode. 
"Criminal episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-1-401 (1990), which provides: 
In this part unless the context requires 
a different definition, "single criminal 
episode" means all conduct which is closely 
related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Defendant apparently denies the two homicides were 
committed in the course of one criminal episode (Appellant's 
Brief at 35). However, he effectively admits the events were 
closely related in time, when he states, "The entire fight lasted 
only a matter of minutes (Appellant's Brief at 37). Thus, the 
immediate issue is whether defendant's acts were directed to 
accomplishing a single criminal objective. In denying such a 
result, defendant misapplies relevant authority. 
In State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977), the 
defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping, as a result of his forcibly relieving a police 
officer of his revolver and thereafter using hitchhikers as 
hostages to avoid apprehension at a roadblock. The court 
concluded that the defendant was not entitled to avoid 
responsibility for the two convictions because the two offenses 
occurred at different times and places and the criminal objective 
of robbery was "entirely different" than that of kidnapping. Id., 
at 1207. See also State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 
1977) (refusing to hold, for double jeopardy purposes, that a 
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theft to gain unlawful possession of an automobile followed the 
next day by an unlawful stop following a high speed chase to 
avoid apprehension was a single criminal episode); State v. 
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (burglary and a theft 
occurring twenty minutes apart in two separately secured 
buildings was a single criminal episode). 
In State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987), this 
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for first degree murder 
under section 76-5-202(1)(b). The body of one victim was found 
in Lark, the other in the Jordan River near 2100 South, Salt Lake 
City. There were no eyewitnesses to the killings and evidence 
only that, during the period the victims were missing, the 
defendant's activities could not be accounted for over a period 
of about one and one-half hours. Notwithstanding such 
circumstantial evidence, this Court found there was sufficient 
evidence that the two victims were killed at the same time and in 
the course of one criminal episode. .Id. at 1054. 
It is defendant's burden to marshal evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict when challenging sufficiency of evidence. 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990). Both this 
Court and the court of appeals have made the marshaling 
requirement a prerequisite to reviewing insufficient evidence 
claims. State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475076 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to 
consider the defendant's attorney representation claim for 
failure to marshal evidence, noting that without evidence to 
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support the trial court's ruling, the appellate court is 
compelled to search the record for facts on which it can base a 
meaningful review). In this case defendant has entirely failed 
to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict. 
In contradistinction to the defendants in Ireland and 
Cornish, defendant, if not by himself then with his cohorts, 
murdered the Newinghams in pursuing the single criminal objective 
of ejecting them from the Gabaldon property with unlawful force. 
Defendant admitted he first threatened Don Newingham with a 
knife, stating that he and Gabaldon did not want him there (T. 
1263). As Don and Salas retreated, defendant followed them to 
the car, backed by his friends (T. 878). When Don was attacked 
by Gabaldon and a fight ensued, defendant stabbed Don to death 
(T. 881-83). Shayne Newingham immediately jumped out of the car 
to help his father and was confronted by Martinez, Manuel 
Alvarez, DeHerrera, Negrete and Gabaldon (T. 884-85). Within 
moments he too was stabbed to death (T. 886, 1236). Velasquez 
testified that he witnessed defendant stab Shayne Newingham 
(T. 886). Considering that one killing almost immediately 
followed the other, all with the purpose of ejecting unwanted 
visitors from the premises with unlawful force, this dual 
homicide must be regarded as one criminal episode. On such 
eyewitness testimony, this Court can find there was sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict convicting defendant of 
first degree murder. 
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That the jury did not convict defendant also of 
Shayne's killing, while it may appear inconsistent with its 
finding him criminally liable for the incidental homicide 
required under section 76-5-202(1)(b), is immaterial to the 
question of whether there was sufficient evidence. In State v. 
Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) habeas corpus 
granted on other grounds, Stewart v. DeLand, 830 P.2d 306 (1992), 
a case presenting a very similar scenario, the Court found that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions of two 
prisoners even though the codefendants were acquitted in the face 
of equally incriminating evidence. Ici. at 612. Commenting on 
the apparent inconsistency of verdicts, this Court stated: 
The acquittal of Coleman and Dominquez 
[codefendants] does not necessarily require 
appellants' acquittal. "That the verdict may 
have been a result of compromise, or of a 
mistake on the part of the jury is possible. 
But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation 
or inquiry into such matters.'• Dunn v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932). 
Ibid. On rehearing, the Court stated: 
In our review, we need make no 
quantitative or qualitative comparison of the 
evidence as between the different defendants. 
We merely consider whether the evidence 
against appellant . . . . 
. • . Even if we acquiesced in appellant's 
argument that the evidence was no greater 
against him that against others, it is 
generally accepted that the inconsistency of 
verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground 
to set the verdicts aside. • . . A jury's 
acguittal of a defendant . . . may also 
result from some . . . lenity on the jury's 
part. 
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. . . Courts have always resisted inquiring 
into the jury's thought processes and 
deliberations. 
Id, at 628-29 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). In sum, 
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that 
defendant was criminally responsible for two homicides under the 
first degree murder statute, notwithstanding any presumed 
inconsistency in not also finding defendant guilty for the 
killing of Shayne Newingham. 
Defendant apparently takes for granted that accomplice 
liability is a necessary element of the double homicide variation 
murder in the first degree, and therefore his acquittal of 
Shayne's death removes him from the operation of the section 76-
5-202(1)(b) (Appellant's Brief at 36-37). Assuming, arguendo, 
the necessity of accomplice liability, there was still sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict, notwithstanding his 
acquittal of Shayne's death. 
"A participant who encourages or assists others in a 
crime may be found guilty when the evidence supports his 
conviction." Stewart, 729 P.2d at 611 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-202 (1978)).15 Accomplice liability may be found even 
though the defendants have not been shown to have actually fired 
the gun or delivered the blows or threats on the victims, if they 
are shown to have participated in the offenses through their 
15
 Utah Code Ann. $ 76-2-202 (1990), unamended since its 
enactment in 1973, and providing for the liability of parties is 
quoted in full in the State's discussion of the sufficiency of 
evidence to support the imposition of the "gang enhancement" rsee 
Appellee's Brief at 59) and in Addendum A. 
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encouragement of unlawful acts. Virgin Islands v. Navarro, 513 
F.2d 11 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 422 U.S. 1045, 95 S. Ct. 2662 
(1975) (holding three codefendants responsible for the assault 
and murder of an off-duty policeman and his brother, 
respectively, where the codefendants encircled the victims and 
shouted, "Kill him," in unison, though victims were shot at and 
assaulted by another); State v. Moczyqemba, 379 P.2d 557 (Ore. 
1963) (finding four prisoners responsible for assault with a 
dangerous weapon, although no single prisoner could be identified 
as the knife wielder). 
Defendant's actions, before those of any others, 
elevated the incident at issue here to hostility. His knife 
wielding, followed by his viciously stabbing Don Newingham, was 
ample evidence of his encouragement of his fellows in assaulting 
Shayne in a deadly manner. More importantly, defendant was 
witnessed to have also stabbed Shayne, an act which would surely 
evidence his aid and encouragement of DeHerrera, who may also 
have stabbed Shayne Newingham. Thus, even if accomplice 
liability is necessary under the statute, the evidence is 
sufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
ACTED IN CONCERT WITH TWO OR MORE PERSONS 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.1 (SUPP. 
1992), WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
At the conclusion of the guilt phase, defendant waived 
the jury for the penalty phase (T. 1414). The trial court, after 
sentencing defendant to life imprisonment, thereafter imposed a 
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twenty-year minimum sentence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (Supp. 1992), the "gang enhancement" (T. 1424). In support 
of its imposition of the gang enhancement, the trial court 
entered findings of fact demonstrating that defendant had acted 
in concert with at least two other persons (T. 1424; R.344-47, 
attached at Addendum B). 
When challenging a trial court's factual findings, "the 
appellant must show that the findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous" by marshaling "all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrating] that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an attack." 
Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) provides: 
(l)(a) A person who commits any offense 
listed in Subsection (3) in concert with two 
or more persons is subject to an enhanced 
penalty for the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" 
as used in this section means the defendant 
and two or more other persons would be 
criminally liable for the offense as parties 
under Section 76-2-202. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-202 (1990) provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental 
state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
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In this case defendant fails to fully marshal the 
evidence demonstrating the involvement of others to the extent 
they are liable as parties. The evidence was abundant that Tony 
DeHerrera could have been found liable for intentionally causing 
the death of Shayne Newingham. Five witnesses collectively 
testified that DeHerrera had offered one of them the use of a 
knife during the fight (T. 1032), held bloody knives following 
the fight (T. 1129-30), sought to have the knives hidden 
following the fight (T. 1143) and admitted to stabbing at least 
one of the victims (T. 1055, 1097, 1109, 1114, 1143). Anthony 
Valerio testified that he saw DeHerrera stab Shayne (T. 1236, 
1256). Richard Gabaldon, who pled to two counts of aggravated 
assault (T. 602). He admitted to having stomped Don Newingham in 
the face, apparently while Salas attempted to cover Don, both he 
and Don covered with blood. Gabaldon admitted that as he stomped 
Don his (Gabaldon's) sister, Kim, implored him, "Leave him alone. 
You're killing him." (T. 647-56, 886, 929-30, 1178-80). 
Defendant mistakenly assumes that accomplice liability, 
pursuant to section 76-2-202, requires that those acting with 
defendant also be found criminally liable for intentionally 
causing one of the deaths. In State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 
1983), this Court stated: "A defendant can be criminally 
responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of 
his responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the 
acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental 
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state of the actor* This is clear from the language of 
S 76-2-202 . . . .M Id. at 534 (emphasis in original). Thus, 
DeHerrera and Gabaldon could have been found parties under 
section 76-2-202 even though, in aiding and abetting the killings 
of the Newinghams they did not act with an intent to kill. Party 
liability would attach even if they had some lesser culpable 
mental state. 
The trial court's written findings stated, in pertinent 
part: 
2. This offense was committed in concert 
with two or more persons, including but not 
limited to the criminal participation in the 
assaults causing the deaths of Donald and 
Shayne Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel 
Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, Tony DeHererra 
[sic] and others unknown, each of which would 
be criminally liable as parties to the 
offense. 
(T. 347) 
In this case Gabaldon pled to two counts of aggravated 
assault. Manuel Alvarez was referred to juvenile court in 
connection with this incident and charged and convicted of 
assault (T. 750). DeHerrera was also charged (T. 750). Further, 
there was evidence to show that Fernando Negrete could have been 
charged with assault for hitting Shayne (T. 1031). 
On the basis of the above-referenced facts the trial 
court's findings, which comport substantially with the facts, 
cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. 
61 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm, defendant's 
conviction and sentence. 
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United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Annotated 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder of offenses 
and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different 
definition, "single criminal episode" means all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of 
offense or for conduct of another. 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Annotated 
76-3-203.1. Offenses committed by three or more persons -
Enhanced penalties. 
(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in 
Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is subject to 
an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided below. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this 
section means the defendant and two or more other persons would 
be criminally liable for the offense as parties under Section 
76-2-202. 
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this 
section are: 
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life 
sentence is imposed, the convicted person shall be sentenced to a 
minimum term of 20 years in prison. 
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are: 
• • • . 
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 
5, Part 2[.] 
76-5-202. Aggravated murder. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the 
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
. • . . 
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, 
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more 
persons are killed. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS RE: IMPOSITION 
OF SENTENCE AND 
APPLICABILITY OF §76-203.1 
U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant 
Sentencing proceedings were had on November 29, 1990 
before this Court, wherein defendant had been found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree, the Court having entered and recorded said verdict. 
Defendant, represented by counsel, Robert Van Sciver, 
waived any rights to waiting any minimum time before proceeding 
with the imposition of sentence. The State of Utah, by and through 
its counsel presented facts in aggravation of the sentence, and the 
defendant through his counsel presented facts in mitigation of the 
sentence. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
Of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
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Having carefully considered the evidence adduced at trial 
and the sentencing proceedings, arguments of counsel and being 
otherwise fully informed in the matter the Court enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
1." AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
a. The defendant was the actual perpetrator of the 
offense where he personally inflicted numerous stab wounds to the 
back of Donald Newingham without justification and committed said 
intentional killing incident to one course of conduct and criminal 
episode during which, in addition to causing the death of Donald 
Newingham, Shane Newingham was killed; 
b. The defendant has a significant history of juvenile 
adjudications wherein if such offenses were committed by an adult, 
said record would show a propensity for violence and a disregard 
for the rights of others; 
c. The defendant has enmeshed himself in an environment 
of continuing anti-social conduct, through the inauspicious 
guidance and participation in a street gang known as "Diamond 
Street" as reflected in testimony adduced at trial and as depicted 
in photographs of graffiti and other drawings introduced in the 
sentencing proceedings; 
C0345 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
Of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
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2. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
a. The defendant was at the time of offense and remains 
at the time of sentencing, 17 years of age, and therefore was 
relatively young at the time of the offense; 
b. The defendant had consumed a great deal of alcohol 
immediately prior to the commission of the offense which 
substantially impaired the defendant's ability to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
Having found these aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to be true, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS EEgARPlNS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY 
The aggravating circumstances do not outweigh by a 
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" the mitigating 
circumstances found, and therefore the Court imposes the sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
Having imposed the sentence of life in prison, the Court 
now enters its findings regarding the applicability of Section 
76-3-203.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
1. The defendant having been found guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree has been adjudged guilty of a 
capital offense for which a life sentence has been imposed; 
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2. This offense was committed in concert with two or 
more persons, including but not limited to the criminal 
participation in the assaults causing the deaths of Donald and 
Shane Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel Martinez, Manuel 
Alvarez, Tony DeHererra and others unknown, each of which would be 
criminally liable as parties to the offense. 
3. The Court finds no circumstances, in the interests of 
justice, or otherwise, which would justify suspension of imposition 
or the execution of the enhanced sentence. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the enhanced penalty 
provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended applies and defendant is ordered to serve a minimum term of 
twenty years in prison. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, commitment to issue forthwith and 
execution of sentence is to commence from the oral order of the 
Court given on the 23rd day of November 1990 in open court. 
DATED this c* day of December, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: Imposition of 
Sentence and Applicability of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. was mailed to 
Robert Van Sciver, Attorney for Defendant at 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 4th day of December, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y ^ A T & O F UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
—JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff. c
 v~~ "(COMMITMENT) 
901901149 
T vs. I Case No. . Count No. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ \ Honorable RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
Clerk KATHY GROTEPAS 
(JAIL) 1 Reoorter HAL WALTON 
l f R e p o r t e r
 LYNN HUFFMAN Bailiff 
Defendant. ' Date NOVEMBER 29, 1990 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by jp a jury; O the court; O plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of Cr im ina l Hnmir i r ie, Murder i n the F i r s t Degraea felony 
of the l s t degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by Rt VanSCJVer, and the State being represented by K- Mnrggp is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
MINIMUM 
XX3 to a)titMMM mandatory term of ZQ years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
O of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
G Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
XX$ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyXXfor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
XXffl Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
ADDENDUM D 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER (#3319) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
FILED BJSTniCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV o l 1990 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
r 
A Deputy Cterk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO PRECLUDE DEATH 
QUALIFICATION OF THE 
JURY VENIRE 
Case No. 901901149 
(Judge Moffat) 
The Defendant, by his attorney, moves this Court for an 
Order Precluding Death Qualification of the Jury Venire in 
Defendant's Trial. Defendant asserts that death qualification 
creates juries which are under-representative of the community at 
large, are conviction prone, and are more likely to impose the 
death penalty. Thus, the effect is to deny him of the right to a 
fair trial, in violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and of Article I, Section 7 of tKdvUtah Constitution. 
A capital case is the only case where ju/orslare told from the 
outset to think about the penalty which shbuld dr could be imposed. 
Dated this day of s ^ 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Preclude Death Qualification of the Jury Venire 
was hand-delivered to Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, 231 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111/ on ] the 1^7 day of 
October, 1990. 
n n an 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. N 
Before you can convict the defendant, Fred A, Alvarez, of 
the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, as 
charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 9th day of June, 1990, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Fred A. Alvarez, caused the death of 
Don Newingham; and 
2. That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death either 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
3- That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death under 
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or 
more persons were killed. 
4. That Fred A. Alvarez did so unlawfully. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proved each and every one of the above mentioned 
elements, you must convict the defendant. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree. 
ADDENDUM F 
JCltu vtsi mCT GWWT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 9 1990 
By \L6L 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ANSWER TO JURY INQUIRY 
Your are first directed to Instruction No. 6: 
The elements of the offense are containedAInstruction 11 for Count I and 
Instruction 12 for Count II. The definitions for these* Instructions 
are contained in Instructions No. 13, 15 and 18. By reviewing these 
Instructions you should be able to answer that question. 

ADDENDUM G 
RUB DISTRICT COUf?T 
Third Judicial District 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER (#3319) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT 
Case No. 901901149 
(Judge Moffat) 
The defendant, by his attorney, moves the Court to strike 
the language entitled "Sentencing Enhancement" from the Information 
on file in this case. The grounds for this motion are: 
1. The magistrate made no finding after the preliminary 
hearing that there was probable cause to believe §76-3-203.1 
applied in this case. 
2. The State failed to prove at the preliminary hearing 
as a matter of law that the enhancement applied. 
3. Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutionally vague and 
consequently denies the defendant due process \f law as guaranteed 
by the state and federal constitutions. 
Dated this day of October, A990. "j$-
ROBERT-VShTSC IVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Strike Sentencing Enh^ Htf^ ipent was hand 
delivered to B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County A^£^*n^Yr 231 East 400 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the/ ASr/l day of October, 
1990. 
ADDENDUM H 
1 MR. VAN SCIVER: I don't see that. 
2 THE COURT: No. I don't, either. 
3 MR. MORGAN: He has no standing to raise gender 
4 anyway, your Honor. 
5 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, no. I don't think that's 
5 true. 
7 MR. MORGAN: There is no male/female issue that 
3 the Court has ever recognized as being a member of an 
9 J insular minority and the fact that he is male does not 








MR. MORGAN: Much less which no court has ever 
held that he is entitled to a fair cross-section. 
Move on to whatever else you may think, Bob. 
| 6 I MR. VAN SCIVER: Let me just find a little 
17 authority here. You're dead wrong. 
Ig THE COURT: If you're not going to raise it, 
19 what difference does it make? 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: It probably does. But I don't 
21 want him to think that the systematic exclusion of women 
22 as opposed to men is a Constitutionally constituted exercise 
23 I of a pre-emptory. 
24 I think the biggest problem here is Hispanics. 
25 His first pre-emptory/ he took three Hispanics on the panel. 
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1 He took one of them with his first pre-emptory and the 
2 second one with his fifth. 
3 MR. MORGAN: I'm entitled to exempt— 
4 THE COURT: You think that shows a pattern of 
5 exclusion of Hispanics? 
6 MR. VAN SCIVER: That is what this case stands 
7 for. Says, "Here, the jury was charged with deciding 
g whether De Gross, a Hispanic woman, illegally aided and 
9 abetted the transportation of undocumented Mexican aliens 
Q into the United States, an offense that arguably has racial 
I and ethnic overtones. The prosecutor exercised a pre-
emptory challenge against the only Hispanic on the jury. 
The combination of these relevant circumstances convinces us 
that a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been 
made." 
I think the burden shifts to him. 
THE COURT: Whose case? What's the case? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Which case? 
9 I THE COURT: Batson? 
20 MR. MORGAN: Batson is black. 
2| i MR. VAN SCIVER: This is De Gross, part of Batson 
22 I progeny« 
2* THE COURT: What court? 
2 4 MR. VAN SCIVER: U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth 
25 Circuit, which is, you know, California. 
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1 MR, MORGAN: That would fall under Batson, your 
2 Honor, because if there was only one Hispanic to choose 
3 from and the prosecutor did eliminate that Hispanic, he 
4 would have removed all Hispanics from the jury. 
5 THE COURT: By the same token, I'm not sure 
6 you're entitled to do that as long as it's not done for a 
^ race neutral reason. 
8 MR. MORGAN: Excuse me? 
9 MR. VAN SCIVER: That's exactly right. Now, he 
10 has to demonstrate the race neutral reason. 
11 MR. MORGAN: We're not there, yet. Batson stands 
12 for the proposition that the prosecutor, if the defense 
13 can show that the prosecutor or his office engages in 
14 systematic exclusion of a particular race, then the burden 
15 shifts to us to show neutral and exempt reasons; however, 
16 it said that can never be shown merely because you exclude 
17 one or more of that insular minority from the jury. You 
18 must exclude them all in order for the defense to make out 
19 a prima facie case. And then the burden would shift to me. 
20 Now, I would submit to the Court at this point 
21 that the State has permitted and wants Robert Galvez, a 
22 Hispanic, on that jury, and that puts us into a situation 
21 where I believe your Honor has to have some evidence from 
24 Counsel showing that I am in a position of systematically 
25 excluding minorities from the jury. The fact that I choose 
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1 two does not put me in a position yet without some showing 
2 from Counsel that I am engaging in any kind of racial 
3 activity at this point. 
4 And for the record, I certainly deny it and I am 
5 prepared with neutral and detached reasons. 
6 MR. VAN SCIVER: Let's hear them. 
7 MR. MORGAN: I want the Court to make a finding. 
8 THE COURT: Bob, I have a problem here in 
9 defining Hispanic. I had a conversation about this with 
tO Andy Valdez. Hispanics, for generations and is the site 
11 where former Mexican citizens who come here and settle and 
12 I would say obviously yes. Is it their progeny? Probably 
13 y e s -
14 What about the grandchildren where the first 
15 generation perhaps marries people of other ethnic back-
1$ grounds? What about great-grandchildren? How far do we 
17 go down the road, and I don't think that's just because 
18 somebody carries a name that has historically had a Hispanic 
19 or Spanish background that that necessarily labels them as 
20 being a part of a discrete minority. So, I have a little 
21 problem here. 
22 Are you telling me we have got three or four here 
2| where I don't have any evidence whatsoever that you haven't 
24 got a half dozen, or what the hell group we're talking 
25 about? What are these people? Do they fit within the 
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category? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: The two people I'm referring to 
in the exercise of his first pre-emptory challenge which 
was Annie Sanchez, who is on the panel, and the second, or 
the second objectionable one was Wendy Mayeda, and that's 
Juror No. 21. That was the prosecutor1s fifth challenge. 
All right. 
Now, this is what they talk about. The litigants 
might demonstrate that this fact—the party cannot challenge 
a venire person on account of their group membership. And 
I think group membership has been established because 
they're Hispanics. 
THE COURT: How do you know they're Hispanic? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, they have Hispanic names. 
You can't dilute the concept of identification simply 
because they're third or fourth generation. That's— 
THE COURT: What if Wendy Mayeda is married and 
she married a Hispanic? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, that doesn't—she's a 
Hispanic and married a Hispanic? 
THE COURT: No. What if she's not Hispanic and 
married a Hispanic? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: She appears to be Hispanic and 
has a Hispanic name. That's all I can do. 



























MR. VAN SCIVER: Let me read what it says so we 
get it in. The burden then shifts to the offending party 
to articulate a nondescript minority reason related to the 
particular case to be tried for challenging the jury. The 
District Court finding regarding purposeful discrimination 
in jury selection process are findings which we will not 
set aside unless clearly onerous. Here, they set them 
aside. 
The case I saw appealed, Judge Young required them 
to put something on the record. Here, we cannot say the 
District Court's inference on account of gender was clearly 
onerous to challenge and then they go on to say about this 
one, Hispanic and taking him off. 
MR. MORGAN: We're mumbling through the first 
part. Where have I systematically excluded? I have taken 
two our of three. 
Your Honor, make a finding that that's systematic 
exclusion or not. 
THE COURT: I don't think it is. 
MR. MORGAN: All right. Further argument would 
be two out of three, as I eliminated two female Hispanics 
and left the male Hispanic. But your client is not female, 
he's male, so that doesn't work. 
Further, I testify on the record and swear as an 
officer of the Court, that I have neutral and detached 
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reasons that if this Court requires me or would even like 
me to make a record further. 
THE COURT: I think in spite of the fact I do not 
think this shows a pattern of exclusion of Hispanics, 
particularly in view of the fact we had three out of 38 to 
start with, or three out of 32. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: So that you know and we are 
complete on that, there are four people. Do you want their 
names for the record? 
10 I THE COURT: I don't care. You can put them in if 
11 you want. 
12 MR. VAN SCIVER: I'll call their numbers then. 
13 Jurors 21, 28 and 46 appears to be Hispanics and have 
14 Hispanic names. Juror No. 42 appears to be Hispanic in 
15 appearance, and I took her off because she was going to 
15 sleep. 
17 MR. MORGAN: I didn't recognize Mrs. Anderson as 
18 being Hispanic. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I didn't either, but I think in 
20 view of you now end up with one Hispanic out of 12, that's 
2i greater than five percent. I don't know about the 
22 percentages. But I did calculate that, and it's greater 
2j than five percent make-up of the jury and since you and I 
24 were discussing it earlier in the process of this jury 





the Hispanics are you're defining them for this purpose in 
the community. I think you've got a decent cross-section 
of the community in that representation and I frankly don't 
think that the taking off of those two, if they are 
Hispanic, would constitute a discrete minority pattern here. 
But I do think in order to make this complete for the 
record, having taken that stand, Mr. Morgan, you ought to 
put on the record the reasons for excluding those two 
jurors and at least we've got a complete record on it. 
MR. MORGAN: Okay. Mr. Van Sciver, you're not 
alleging that I engaged in purposeful discrimination, but 
other than by eliminating those two, you're not accusing 
me of being a racist? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: VJhat if I were? 









.. I MR. VAN SCIVER: I don't understand what you're 
-g thinking. I am accusing you of consciously and deliberately 
taking Hispanics off this jury, Mr. Morgan, and in a 
contrived effort to take minorities in this case out of this 
case, yes. I'm accusing you of that. 
„ I MR. MORGAN: That's based only upon eliminating 
•j two of the jurors? 
, MR. VAN SCIVER: There are three Hispanics and you 
-5 eliminated two-thirds. You consciously did that with your 
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first and fifth pre-emptory. 
MR. MORGAN: Not based on any personality or 
anything like that. You've alleged there are four. You 
took one off, I had taken half of them off and you took a 
quarter of them off. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, if Joan Anderson, who 
appears to be Hispanic— 
MR. MORGAN: We donft know that. You allege you 
thought she was. 
10 I MR. VAN SCIVER: Hispanic in appearance and the 
11 reason I took her off, she was going to sleep. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. But the point still is, if 
13 that's the case, then he's taking off two out of four and 
14 you've taken one out of four, right? 
15 MR. MORGAN: Right. 
16 MR. VAN SCIVER: Doesn't make any difference. 
17 THE COURT: I think it does. 
1* MR. VAN SCIVER: Certainly have given you a race 
1* neutral reason for taking my person off the jury. 
20 THE COURT: Well, I don't deny it, but the point 
*1 of it is, you don't take yours off and reduce the then 
22 number available to three and accuse him of taking two-
21 thirds of them off. He took half of the Hispanics that 
24 were available off. He didn't take two-thirds of them. 
25 That's what I •in saying to you. 
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1 MR. VAN SCIVER: Okay. 
2 MR. MORGAN: I would like to proceed in case the 
3 Court's finding that there is no systematic exclusion to 
4 set aside. The prosecutor's neutral non-race reasons are as 
5 follows: Wendy Mayeda, the State took off, Juror No. 21, 
6 for the following reasons: She's youthful, she indicated 
7 she would be suffering a financial hardship and she also 
8 indicated she has personal problems and would have difficult; 
9 in concentrating, and that she's going through a separation, 
10 even though she is not married at the time. She also 
11 indicated that although she would follow the Court's 
12 instructions with regard to the death penalty, that she had 
13 some scruples over the death penalty. For those reasons, 
14 the State elected its pre-emptory challenge and removed 
15 Wendy Mayeda from the panel. 
16 With respect to Annie Sanchez, Juror No. 46, the 
17 State pre-empted her for the following neutral, non-racial 
18 reasons. She is youthful, she's 21 years old. She seemed 
19 to identify with the defendant during the course of the 
20 jury voir dire. She was constantly looking at him. She 
21 also indicated that she had scruples against the death 
22 penalty, even though she would follow, she had to be talked 
23 to quite a bit in comparison to the rest of the jurors, 
24 about her ability to pass on the death penalty; therefore, 
25 for those reasons, the State pre-empted Annie Sanchez, 
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1 Juror No. 46, using its first pre-emptory challenge. 
2 MR. VAN SCIVER: May I respond to that? 
3 THE COURT: Well, you may. 
4 MS. BYRNE: What is there to respond to? He just 
5 gave his reasons. 
6 THE COURT: Gave you the reasons. 
1 MR. VAN SCIVER: Well, and I'm not going to 
8 respond to 21. I'm only going to respond to 46. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. VAN SCIVER: All right. Seemed to identify 
11 with the defendant is the very basis why his pre-emptory 
12 and it's his first one. 
13 MR. MORGAN: Good point. 
14 MR. VAN SCIVER: It's race oriented. 
15 MR. MORGAN: Good point. Like to clarify that. 
16 Seemed to identify based upon her youth# based on her eye 
17 contact with him and based on her friendliness toward the 
18 defendant. Not that she identified in the sense they were 
19 from the same culture. 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: All right. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Go back. 
22 (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m.f the Court reassembled.) 
23 THE COURT: The clerk will read the names of the 
M jurors and the two alternates chosen to serve in this case. 





















I very good job and entailed a lot of sitting. And like I 
say, my doctor says— 
THE COURT: I don't want to impose the possibility 
of inflicting any physical harm on this possible juror, 
Mr. Van Sciver. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I have no objections, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right with you? 
MR. MORGAN: Yes, your Honor. I agree. 
THE COURT: I think under the circumstances, we 
won't impose on you in this case and I'll excuse you at 
this time. 
MR. WIGGINS: All rignt, sir. 
-3 I THE COURT: I appreciate your coming. 
- , MR. WIGGINS: I won't have to come back Friday? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Thank you. 
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you. I appreciate it. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken at this time.) 
THE COURT: I believe the bailiff indicated to me 
20 I yesterday that you had some concerns that you wanted to 
21 J voice privately. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I'm going through a separatiorj 
right now. We're not married, we just lived together. And 
24 I'm just having a really hard time with trying to deal with 
25 J all that; and then trying to deal with this and concentrate 
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I on this, too. And I just wanted to bring that to your 
2 attention and let you know. 
3 I THE COURT: Well, of course, this is a very, very 
4 J important matter, as you can well understand. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 
6 I THE COURT: It's a problem that somebody, either 
7 you or somebody like you, is going to have to spend some 
g time on this jury, and both the State and Mr. Alvarez are 
entitled to have somebody pay attention to the evidence in 
this case and to do the best job they can. All of us in 
life, unfortunately, have to go through personal crises as 
well as do other things that are required of them during 
the course of their life, and believe me when I tell you tha 
I know that it's difficult to do these things. I know that 
you have to do it, because I've just recently gone through 
the same kind of situation, where, in my personal life, 
there was a tremendous crisis and I still had to come down 
here and continue to function. I don't mean to belittle 
your problems, but we do need your services and that you 
would need to be able to apply your attention and your 
best efforts to help us solve this case. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. I would try. 
THE COURT: Sure you would. In this case, 
24 I Mr. Alvarez is charged with two counts of first-degree 

















. counts, or if you found him guilty only of a lesser charge, 
then the jury's function would be concluded and it would 
• I be up to the Court to sentence, if the sentence is appro-



















On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty of 
either of those two first-degree homicides, then the jury 
would have evidence submitted to it of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. And do you understand what I am 
saying when I talk about aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances? 
^S. MAYEDA: You mean intentional or— 
THE COURT: Well, things of that sort; in other 
words, things that would make the commission of the murder 
understand? And the mitigating circumstances would be 
things which make it less that way. And only if the State 
.- could prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury would 
have to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
19 aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances; and that the death penalty was the only appropriate 
penalty. The jury has to find both of those provisions or 
they do not bring in the death penalty. You would have to 
impose life imprisonment instead. 
How do you feel about the death penalty in this 
25 case? Do you have any ideas or ever thought about it, or 
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1 how you feel about it? 
2 MS. MAYEDA: I just feel I donft have any right 
3 to really judge or to really say if this person should be 
4 allowed to die or to live. I mean that's—that's a pretty 
5 big decision for—I mean—even though the evidence—I 
6 don't really feel that anybody really deserves to die. 
7 That's a lot, and that's really hard for me t o — 
8 THE COURT: Let me ask it this way. 
• MS. MAYEDA: — t o say— 
10 THE COURT: I understand it's a momentous and a 
11 terrific burden. But let me put it to you this way: I 
12 would instruct you after you have heard the aggravating and 
13 mitigating evidence, I would instruct you that the jury 
14 must unanimously find, and that means every juror would 
15 have to agree to the verdict, that the State has proved 
16 beyond a reasonable doubt and that's the standard that I 
17 read to you yesterday. 
18 MS. MAYEDA: Uh huh (affirmative). 
19 THE COURT: First, that the aggravating circun-
20 stances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and second, 
21 that death is the only appropriate penalty. 
22 Now, if you found in your own mind that the State 
23 proved that beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to 
24 vote for the death penalty? 
25 MS. MAYEDA: I don't know. That's pretty hard— 
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1 p r e 11y ha r d d e c i s i on . 
2 THE COI JRT : Wi : ] 1 , i I * I: .a t : d dec i si on .. Wl l I I 
3 am saying i s, assuming t hat you were coi winced beyond a 
4 reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances out .-
5 we ighed 11 ie mitigatii ig c ircurns tai ices and 11 Iat 11 i y >i! « * > > > " < 
6 beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty was ti.e •. .. 
7 appropriate pena] ty; could you then vote for the death 
8 p e n a ] t y ::i f > ::: "i ::i i ; • s i: e s c ::  :::) i: :t \ :i i: i c e d i ' 
9 MS, MA.YEDA: I don't know even i f I was convinced 
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penalty. Yeah. That's just— 
THE COURT: Well, the standard is higher to be 
required or to allow you to vote for the death penalty. 
The standard is higher because you've got to be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of both of those propositions. 
But in order to impose instead of the death penalty, the 
life imprisonment, you don't have to be convinced. You 
can be convinced that either one, or both, or neither has 
been proven, so you see, it's obviously to get to the life 
penalty and I'm not sure we've satisfactorily answered the 
question. 
Do you think that you could impose the death 
penalty if you were convinced that the State had met its 
burden of proof in those two regards? 
MS. MAYEDA: I don't think so. I mean, I can see 
whatever the evidence is and, you know, whatever they find 
him guilty of or anything, I can see for him, you know, 
painful paying for what he did, and for me to judge for him 
to have the death penalty, I don't think I could do that, 
to be honest with you. That's pretty hard. 
MR. MORGAN: May I? You recall the question, the 
Judge said would you follow the law as he instructed you? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I understand the Judge. 
MR. MORGAN: Well, we'll be telling you that that'sj 
the law and that if you're convinced beyond a reasonable 
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1 was picked for the jury with the evidence and everything. 
2 It's just the death penalty just seems so much for me. 
3 THE COURT: I understand. Do you have strong 
4 religious beliefs? 
5 MS. MAYEDA: Uh—yeah. I am religious, but I'm 
5 not anything really to have to do with that. 
7 THE COURT: Nothing in religion that would prevent 
3 you from imposing the death penalty? 
9 I MS. MAYEDA: No. 
IQ THE COURT: Are you telling me then that you would 
11 be able to follow the instructions that the Court gave in 
12 regard to the imposition of the death penalty if you were 
13 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence, that 
14 that is what you should do? 
15 MS. MAYEDA: Yes, because I have to follow the 
lg law. Doesn't leave me much choice. 
17 THE COURT: That's right. 
Ig MS. MAYEDA: Doesn't leave me any choice. 
19 THE COURT: And once you've become convinced and 
20 that you have been satisfied with the evidence, that's your 
2| choice and that the Court wouldn't ever instruct you about 
22 that, or that you should or should not believe any evidence 
23 or how you would weigh it. That's your function as a juror. 
24 MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I understand just— 
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1 I MS. MAYEDA: Yes. I do 
2 I THE COURT: If you were on this jury and the jury 
3 were to go into the penalty phase and the jury either did or 
4 did not impose a death penalty and it came down either way, 
i» would you be concerned about any criticism that people 
g might make about the jury's decision? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. 
THE COURT: I don't think we need to ask the last 











prior to this time, other than yesterday? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. I hadn't heard anything. I had 
heard something on the radio this morning and that was it. 
I hadn't heard anything else. 
14 THE COURT: Anything you have heard, could you 
put aside and try this case onlv on the evidence that is 
lg brought into Court and admitted by the Court? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 
Ig I THE COURT: If the evidence suggested or showed 
19 | that the defendant was a member of a gang, would that fact 
20 I alone, cause you to be biased against him? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. No. 
THE COURT: Any Questions? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I'm satisfied, your Honor, 
•4 MR. MORGAN: I am as well, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you very much. Be 
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1 THE COURT: Do you have any feelings at this 
2 point about the death penalty as such? 
3 MS. CARR: They are mixed. 
4 THE COURT: Sure they are. If you were convinced 
5 beyond a reasonable doubt, and do you understand what I am 
6 saying about— 
7 MS. CARR: I am a little confused about aggravat-
8 ing and mitigating. 
9 THE COURT: All right. If the defendant were 
10 found guilty of the crime of first-degree homicide, the 
11 State would then put on evidence which would show that the 
12 circumstances are more activated, heinous, more egregious— 
13 MS. CARR: Something that's kind of more 
14 potentiated, that type— 
15 THE COURT: Right. Of course, the defense would 
16 put on evidence to try and show that the matter was not as 
17 egregious, as serious, as heinous as the State would like 
18 you to believe, so that the evidence would go in. And you 
19 have to weigh whether the aggravating circumstances of the 
20 murder outweigh the mitigating circumstances. And you would 
21 have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that they did. And 
22 then you have to find secondly, that death is the only 
23 appropriate penalty before you could impose the death 
24 penalty. 
25 Do you understand that? Now, assuming that you 
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1 THE COURT: Sure. Would you vote for the death 
2 penalty in order to insure that no release from prison ever 
j occurred instead of voting for life imprisonment? 
4 MS. CARR: No. 
5 THE COURT; You would not? Ckay. 
5 Do you see any conflict between sitting on a 
7 Ju*Y that may impose the death penalty and the teaching of 
g any religion to which you happen to subscribe? 
9 MS. CARR: Put that by me again. 
THE COURT: Do you see any conflict between your 
sitting on a jury which may impose the death penalty and 
the teachings of any religion that you might— 





H THE COURT: --that you might subscribe to? All 
15 right. 
1^  Do you believe that a person with or without 
17 proper professional help, can change and become a different 
18 person and change the course of their life over a period 
19 of time? 
20 MS. CARR: I think most people can with professionajl 
2| help. 
THE COURT: If you were to sit on this jury and 
23 I it returned a verdict in this case either imposing or not 
24 imposing the death penalty; would you be concerned about any 
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duty as a citizen to do this? 
MS. CARR: Well, if I am selected, I'll do it, 
given any choice in the matter, I would rather not. 
THE COURT: You don't have any choice and you 
would rather go on vacation. I understand. 
Have you had any exposure to any of the facts of 
this case prior to yesterday? 
MS. CARR: Nothing. My T.V. is broken and I 
don't take a paper. 
Q I THE COURT: If the evidence suggested or showed 
I J that the defendant is a member of a gang, would that fact 
alone prejudice you against him? 
MS. CARR: Uh—probably not, although my parents 
do live in an area that is, they live here and there is a 
house in Chicago, here and here and behind. I mean, and 
they're surrounded. Everybody belongs to a different gang. 
I've had my car tires stabbed when I was down there 
visiting and my parents have had a lot of vandalism and 
9 I stuff. I really don't think it would prejudice me. I 
20 can't honestly say for sure—absolutely wouldn't. 
2| THE COURT: Anything further? 
22 I MR. VAN SCIVER: I have nothing. 
MR. MORGAN: No. 
24 I THE COURT: No further questions? Very well. 




before you at the time of trial? 
MR. COOK: Yes, I think so. 
THE COURT: If the evidence were that Mr, Alvarez 
was a member of a gang, would that fact alone cause you to 
be biased or prejudiced against him? 
MR. COOK: A little bit maybe, just from what I re£d 
recently. Try not to influence me. 
MR. MORGAN: Nothing further from the State. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Nothing, your Honor. 
10 I THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. Would you come] 
11 I back at 2:00 o'clock on Friday? 
MR. COOK: Sure. 
13 I THE COURT: Rovert Galvez, Juror No. 28. 
14 I Mr. Galvez? 
15 MR. GALVEZ: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Galvez, in this case, the 
17 defendant, Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of 
18 first-degree murder and if the jury found him not guilty 
19 of those charges, or if they came in with a verdict of 
20 guilty of a lesser charge, the jury would have finished 
21 its duty and the case could be discharged and the imposition| 
22 of any penalty that might be required by the law would fall 
23 upon me. 
24 On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty 
25 of either of the two first-degree homicide charges, then the! 
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1 jury would reconvene—this same jury, and evidence would be 
2 put on to show aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
3 Now, do you understand what I'm saying when I 
4 say aggravating and mitigating circumstances? Do you wish 
5 I me to explain that? 
g MR. GALVEZ: Explain it to me. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Aggravating circumstances 
g would be things about the murder, how it occurred that would 
9 make you more desirous of inflicting the death penalty and 
mitigating circumstances would be things about the way it 
occurred and the circumstances under which it occurred 
12 I which would cause you to be less desirous of imposing the 
13 I death penalty. Is that satisfactory? Do you understand 
14 I that? 
15 I MR. GALVEZ: Uh huh (affirmative). 
jg THE COURT: Okay. And then I would instruct 
17 Y o u after you'd heard the evidence from both the State and 
lg from the defendant as to the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. I would instruct you that the death penalty 





2| jurors, found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, first, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
23 the mitigating circumstances; and second, that the death 







1 MR. GALVEZ: Uh huh (affirmative). 
2 THE COURT: Now, let me ask you a couple of 
3 questions. Have you formed any feelings about the death 
penalty? 
- I MR. GALVEZ: Yeah. I have some feelings about 
6 that. 
7 THE COURT: What are your views on the death 
g penalty? 
9 MR. GALVEZ: I don't think they should have it 
except for mass murders, torture slayings or such things. 
Murder, I really don't think that's appropriate. 
THE COURT: If this trial entered the penalty 
phase, as I've just described it, and I gave you an 
1^  I instruction that the jury can only impose the death sentence 
jc after a unanimous finding that the State had proved beyond 
lg a reasonable doubt, first, that the aggravating circumstance^ 
17 outweigh the mitigating; and second, that death is the only 
18 appropriate penalty; and you were convinced beyond a 
19 reasonable doubt that the State had proven both of those 
20 propositions; that is, you personally were convinced of thos 
2| two propositions. Could you vote for the death penalty? 
22 MR. GALVEZ: I would really have to—I don't know 
2j the circumstances. 
24 THE COURT: I understand that. 
25 MR. GALVEZ: Not sure—I'm not really sure what 
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1 you're saying. 
2 THE COURT: What I am saying is, if you were 
3 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating 
4 circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances--
5 MR. GALVEZ: Yes. I know what you mean. 
6 THE COURT: —and also convinced that death was 
7 the only appropriate penalty, would you be willing to vote 
8 for the death penalty? 
9 MR. GALVEZ: If I was convinced death was the 
10 only appropriate, yes. I would. 
11 MR* MORGAN: Sorry, Mr, Galvez. 
12 MR. GALVEZ: If I was convinced that the only 
13 appropriate penalty, probably then yes, I would. 
14 THE COURT: On the other side of the coin, if you 
15 felt that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
16 doubt either one or both of those two propositions, would 
17 you be willing to vote for life imprisonment instead of the 
18 death penalty? The two possible penalties, by the way, 
19 once the defendant has been found guilty, is either life 
20 imprisonment or the death penalty. 
21 MR. GALVEZ: Yes. I would. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Now, during the penalty phase 
23 of this trial, as this evidence comes in, would you be 
24 able to consider the evidence mitigating in favor of the 
25 defendant, and if you found that you thought it was justified 
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1 would you be able to consider voting for a sentence less 
2 than death, that is, the imposition of a life imprisonment 
3 sentence? 
4 I MR. GALVEZ: Yes. I would. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Do you see any conflict 
6 between your sitting on a jury that may impose a death 
7 penalty and the teachings of any religion that you may 
g subscribe to? 
9 I MR. GALVEZ: No. 
JO THE COURT: Do you believe that a person can 
If change with or without professional help and become a 
12 better person, and change his approach and his thinking 
13 over a period of time? 
14 I MR. GALVEZ: Yeah. I do. 
15 THE COURT: If you were on this jury and the jury 
16 either imposed or did not impose a death penalty; in 
17 other words, if it came down that the defendant was found 
18 guilty and the jury imposed either a life imprisonment or 
19 the death penalty; would you be concerned that you may be 
20 criticized for making that decision? 
21 MR. GALVEZ: No. To be honest with you. 
22 THE COURT: What are your feelings about serving 
23 on a jury where the function is to try this first-degree 
24 murder and if the defendant is found guilty of that, you 
25 then will be asked to consider the imposition of a death 
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1 sentence? 
2 MR. GALVEZ: I sure don't like or don't want to, 
3 but probably could. 
4 THE COURT: Do you regard it as a big 
5 responsibility? 
6 MR. GALVEZ: Certainly. 
7 THE COURT: Do you feel that it's a duty that you 
0 have as a citizen to serve on this jury—on a jury like 
9 this? 
10 MR. GALVEZ: Yeah. I do. 
11 THE COURT: Are you willing to do that? 
12 MR. GALVEZ: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: And you're aware of the fact that it's 
14 a very serious imposition, and your undertaking it and I 
15 am sure in all gravity? 
16 MR. GALVEZ: Very much so. 
17 THE COURT: Have you had any exposure to pre-
18 trial publicity before yesterday, with newspapers or 
19 television, or radio, or any other way? 
20 MR. GALVEZ: No. I'm not sure I know what was 
21 done. 
22 THE COURT: You don't recall anything about it? 
23 All right. If the evidence suggested or showed that the 
24 defendant is a member of a gang, would that fact alone cause 
25 you to be biased or prejudiced against the defendant? 
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1 MR. GALVEZ: Probably not. 
2 THE COURT: Anything further? 
• MR. MORGAN: Yes, your Honor. Could you ask the 
4 prospective juror whether or not when these categories, I 
5 think the death penalty might be appropriate, that it might 
g be multiple murder or two or more persons were killed. 
7 THE COURT: Do you believe that if you were 
8 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
9 involved in multiple murders and the other standards were 
met, would you be able to vote for a conviction and also 
for a death penalty in those cases? 
MR. GALVEZ: If I was convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt, yes. 






l5 I THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may be 
jg | excused. Please return at 2:00 on Friday and remember 
17 I my admonition 
13 MR. GALVEZ: Okay. 
j 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
20 Mr. Wilson, how are you? 
2i MR. WILSON: Just great. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, in this case, the 
23 I defendant, Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of 
24 first-degree murder. If the jury were to return a verdict 









MS* FALER: Yes. Of course. 
MR. MORGAN: Could you ask Mrs. Faler whether or 
2 I not she would convict someone who was innocent merely 
4 because they were a member of a gang? 
5 THE COURT: You heard that question. Would you? 
6 I MS. FALER: No. I don't think I would do that. 
7 THE COURT: Would you be able, particularly if 
8 you were so instructed by the Court, to set aside any 
9 feelings that you might have about gangs in general, and 
apply the law as the Court gives it to you; and specifically 
as related to the facts of this case? 
MS. FALER: Well, I would try. 
THE COURT: I'm sure you would. 
14 I MR. VAN SCIVER: I'm satisfied. 
15 i MR. MORGAN: No questions. 
16 I THE COURT: Very well. Would you please return at 
17 2:00 on Friday? 
1g MS. FALER: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you 
20 MR. VAN SCIVER: This next person was a victim of 
2| a robbery. Might want to ask about that. 
22 THE COURT: Darla Chedester? I think we did ask 
23 about it yesterday. Want me to do it again? 
24 I MR. VAN SCIVER: See— 
25 I THE COURT: Have a seat. I believe you indicated 
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1 yesterday, Mrs. Chedester, that you were a victim of a home 
2 burglary, was that it, or a robbery? 
3 MS. CHEDESTER: A robbery. 
4 THE COURT: Personal robbery from your person? 
5 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. I was a teller, I said, in 
g I 1973, but I thought about it after I was driving home, and 
7 it was 1974. And I worked for First Security Bank. 
8 THE COURT: Well, we won't call you a liar for 
9 one year. 
10 MS. CHEDESTER: I was held up at gunpoint. 
11 THE COURT: Oh, gunpoint. And I asked you 
12 yesterday, but let me ask you again so we can clarify this. 
13 Would your experience in that regard cause you in any way to 
14 be unable to fairly and adequately, and without bias for or 
15 against either of the parties in this case, judge the facts 
15 in this matter? 
17 MS. CHEDESTER: No, sir. It wouldnft. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. In this case, Mr. Alvarez is 
19 charged with two counts of first-degree murder; and if the 
20 JurY found him not guilty of either of those counts or if 
2i they found that he was guilty of a lesser charge, then the 
22 jury's function would be completed in this case and the 
23 matter of sentencing would be left to the Court. 
24 On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty of 
25 either of the first-decree murder charges, then the jury 
297 
1 would have to make a determination as to whether he should 
2 then be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. For 
3 that purpose, there would be a further hearing before the 
4 same jury; and there would be evidence introduced before 
5 you as to aggravating circumstances surrounding the crime or 
6 mitigating circumstances surrounding the crime, 
7 And you understand what I'm telling you about 
8 aggravating and mitigating circumstances? 
9 MS. CHEDESTER: I believe so. 
10 THE COURT: Well, let me explain a little more. 
11 MS. CHEDESTER: Okay. 
12 THE COURT: Aggravating circumstances would be 
13 those things which would make you believe more strongly 
14 that the death sentence should be imposed and mitigating 
15 circumstances would be the showing of facts and circum-
16 stances which would make you believe that the death penalty 
17 should not be imposed. 
18 Do you understand that? 
19 MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah. I do. 
20 THE COURT: All right. You would receive an 
21 instruction from the Court that would say that you could not 
22 impose the death penalty if the jury did not vote for the 
23 death penalty unless the jury unanimously, all the members 
24 of the jury, found that the State had proved beyond a 
25 reasonable doubt, that both of these propositions, one, the 
298 
1 aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
2 stances, and, two, that the death penalty was the only 
3 appropriate penalty. 
4 Do you understand that? 
5 MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah. 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you some questions. Have 
7 you formed any feelings about the death penalty—have any 
8 opinion? 
9 MS. CHEDESTER: Hard one to answer. Itfs really 
10 hard to answer, but I have to be honest. 
11 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. Well, 
12 go ahead. 
13 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh--I don't think it's right to 
14 take someone's life, but I don't know that it's wrong for 
15 capital punishment either. Is that what you mean? 
16 THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. If, 
17 after the evidence was put in and during the penalty phase, 
18 you personally were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, 
19 that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
20 circumstances and that death was the only appropriate 
21 penalty, would you be willing to vote for the death penalty? 
22 MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah. I would if it's the only 
23 way. 
24 THE COURT: If, after that evidence had come in, 




1 propositions or neither of them beyond a reasonable doubt, 
2 would you be willing to vote for life imprisonment as 
3 opposed to the death penalty? 
4 MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah. I would. 
5 THE COURT: Would you be able to, at the time the 
5 evidence came in, to look at the evidence in mitigation, 
7 that would be in favor of the defendant, and to apply that 
8 evidence; and if you felt that it was proper, vote for the 
9 lesser penalty, that is to vote for life imprisonment as 
10 opposed to the death penalty? 
MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. I would. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you believe that life 
13 J in prison is a severe penalty? 
14 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—I believe that when you have 
15 your freedom taken from you, it does. 
15 THE COURT: You understand that a person who is 
17 convicted of first-degree murder in Utah, if they are 
13 sentenced to life imprisonment, can be released by the 
19 parole board at a later date, under circumstances to be 
20 determined by the parole board, and it doesn't mean they 
2i necessarily will be, but it's a possibility at some future 
22 date. You understand? 
2j MS. CHEDESTER: Yeah. I do understand that. 
24 THE COURT: If you decided that you were going to 
25 vote for life imprisonment and not the death penalty, would 
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1 you nevertheless vote for the death penalty simply to 
2 prevent the defendant from ever being paroled? 
3 MS. CHEDESTER: No. I don't believe I would do 
4 that. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Do you see any conflict 
6 between your sitting on a jury which may impose the death 
7 penalty and the teachings of any religion to which you 
8 subscribe? 
9 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—could you word that one more 
10 time? Sorry. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. Are there any teachings of a 
12 religion that you believe in, which are in conflict with 
13 your sitting on a jury that may impose the death penalty? 
14 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—no. As I did say, you know, 
15 I am not sure if I believe in capital punishment, but 
16 probably one of the few that don't. Is that what you 
17 meant? 
18 THE COURT: Well— 
19 MS. CHEDESTER: As far as religion, I mean my 
20 religion would probably be within myself of my own beliefs. 
21 THE COURT: Do you believe a person can change 
22 with or without professional help perhaps and become better 
23 over time and change their attitudes, and affect their 
24 life in a better way? 
25 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—when there was—yes. I 
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1 believe that, if they want to. 
2 THE COURT: Do you have any concerns that if you 
3 were sitting on this jury and whether it imposed the death 
4 sentence or the life sentence, that you might be criticized 
5 for whichever sentence was handed down? Do you know if that 
6 would bother you? 
7 MS. CHEDESTER: Urn—I don't believe so, no. 
8 THE COURT: What are your feelings about being 
9 asked to serve on a jury where the guilt or innocence of the 
10 defendant is going to have to be determined as to a first-
11 degree homicide? And if he was found guilty, then you're 
12 going to be requested to consider imposition of a death 
13 penalty. 
14 MS. CHEDESTER: What are my feelings? 
15 THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
16 MS. CHEDESTER: It's a hard one to answer, your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: You feel it's a big burden? 
19 MS. CHEDESTER: Pardon? 
20 THE COURT: You feel it's a heavy burden? 
21 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—I don't know. I have never— 
22 you know—been faced with that. I mean, I understand that 
23 I would be now, if I was called. 




 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. It is. 
2
 THE COURT: One that you have to face seriously? 
3
 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. You would have to give a 
4 lot of thought to and— 
5 THE COURT: You would have to give it your best 
fi attention? 
7
 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. 
• THE COURT: Your best judgment? 
• MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: Do you feel it's a duty that you owe 
11 as a citizen? 
12 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: Are you willing to serve? 
14 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Have you had any exposure to pre-trial 
16 publicity about this case? Did you know anything about it 
17 before now? 
18 MS. CHEDESTER: No. No, I haven't. 
19 THE COURT: If the evidence suggested or showed 
20 that the defendant were a member of a gang, would that fact 
21 alone cause you to be biased against or prejudiced against 
22 the defendant? 
23 MS. CHEDESTER: No. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Van Sciver? 
25 MR. VAN SCIVER: I "m satisfied. 
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1 MR. MORGAN: Just one question. May I ask it 
2 directly? 
3 THE COURT: Sure. 
4 I MR. MORGAN: If I understand you correctly, you 
5 saY You a r e generally against capital punishment. 
6 MS. CHEDESTER: Uh—I don't know that I am against 
7 it, but what I believe is, within myself, is, that as I 
g said before, I don't know that it's right to take someone's 
9 life. But then I don't know if it's right for someone else 
IQ to take their life. So I would imagine, you know, that I'm 
11 not all for it. 
12 MR. MORGAN: You understand this is going to be 
13 your responsibility in this case if you are selected? 
14 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes, I could do. 
15 MR. MORGAN: And that you're actually going to 
15 have to make your own individual decision? 
17 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. 
18 MR. MORGAN: That is, that law that the Judge 
19 read to you a few minutes ago? 
20 MS. CHEDESTER: Right. 
21 THE COURT: That's the law you have to follow. 
22 MS. CHEDESTER: I understand that. 
23 THE COURT: And would you be able to come to a 
24 decision if the death penalty is appropriate in this case, 








1 MS. CHEDESTER: I don't know if I—I'm sorry, but 
2 I don't know if I would want that responsibility t o — 
THE COURT: We need to know now. 
4 I MS. CHEDESTER: — t o say to—you know— 
5 THE COURT: You understand it will be your 
g responsibility? 
MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. I do know that. 
THE COURT: Let me put it this way. You know that 
you may not want the responsibility like every other citizen), 
you have a responsibility to serve on this case when you 
come in. You understand that, too, as a citizen, that you 
are given that responsibility? 
|3 I MS. CHEDESTER: Right. 
.- THE COURT: If you were convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, could you 
.g I find him guilty? 
I7 MS. CHEDESTER: Yes. If he was guilty. 
•8 | THE COURT: And if you were convinced beyond a 
.9 reasonable doubt, talking about you personally, because it 
has to be your own judgment. If you were personally 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances; and 
that death was the only appropriate penalty— 
24 I MS. CHEDESTER: Right, 






1 vote for it? j 
2 I MS, CHEDESTER: Yes. Under those circumstances. 
3 MR. MORGAN: Okay. I'm satisfied. 
4 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you very much and 
5 please come back on Friday at 2:00 o'clock. 
6 MS. CHEDESTER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
8 Mr. Blackham, how are you? 
9 MR. BLACKHAM: Good. 
10 THE COURT: In this case, the defendant, 
11 Mr. Alvarez, is charged with two counts of first-degree 
12 murder. If the jury did not find him guilty of either of 
13 those counts or if they found him guilty of a lesser charge, 
14 then the jury's function would be completed and I would be 
15 responsible for imposing any sentence that might be 
16 imposed. 
17 If the jury found him guilty of either of the 
18 first-degree murder counts, however, then the jury must 
19 decide whether a sentence of life imprisonment or death 
20 is imposed, and that's the jury's function for that purpose. 
21 After the decision of guilt or innocence is made, evidence 
22 would be introduced before the jury as to mitigating or 
23 aggravating circumstances. 
24 And do you understand what I am telling you about? 
25 MR. BLACKHAM: Yeah. 
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1 the jury's function would be over and the question of 
2 sentencing would be left to the Court. 
3 On the other hand, if the jury found Mr. Alvarez 
4 guilty of either or both charges of first degree murder, 
5 it would be up to the jury to impose the penalty; the 
5 penalty to be either the death sentence or life imprisonment 
7 Additional evidence as to aggravating and mitigat-
8 ing circumstances—do you understand that, about aggravating 
9 and mitigating circumstances? Let me explain it to you. 
10 Aggravating circumstances are those circumstances 
11 surrounding the murder which would cause you to be more 
12 inclined to impose the death penalty. And mitigating 
13 circumstances would be those circumstances surrounding the 
14 murder which would cause you to be less inclined to impose 
j£ the death penalty and more inclined to impose life in 
jg prison. Do you understand? 
17 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Now, after you had had that 
19 evidence before you, the Court would instruct you that the 
20 death penalty could be imposed by the jury only after the 
21 JurY unanimously, that is all the members of the jury, 
22 found that the State had proved to each juror's satisfaction 
2j and beyond a reasonable doubt, two circumstances: First, 
24 that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
25 circumstances; and second, that death is the only appropriate 
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1 imprisonment instead of the death penalty? 
2 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
3 THE COURT: If you sat on the penalty phase of 
4 this trial, would you be willing to listen and give 
5 credence and judge the testimony regarding the mitigating 
6 circumstances; and if your judgment was that there should 
7 be a sentence of life imprisonment instead of the death 
8 sentence, would you be willing to vote for it? 
9 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Is life in prison, in 
11 your opinion, a severe penalty? 
12 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
13 THE COURT: Do you understand that in the State of 
14 Utah, a person who commits first-degree murder and is 
15 sentenced to life imprisonment by the jury, may, at some 
16 later date, be paroled by the parole board? 
17 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: If you had decided that you were 
19 going to vote for life imprisonment and not the death 
20 penalty; would you, nevertheless, vote for the death 
21 penalty just to prevent the defendant from being paroled by 
22 the parole board at a later date? 
23 MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
24 THE COURT: Do you see any conflict between your 
25 sitting on a jury that may impose the death penalty and any 
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1 I MS, SANCHEZ: Not really. I mean it is, but I 
2 think it can be dealt with, 
3 THE COURT: You think you can handle it? 
4 I MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
j THE COURT: Do you regard this as an obligation 
g of your citizenship? 
7 MS. SANCHEZ: I feel it is. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. You recognize the seriousness 
9 of this charge? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Your dealing with a man's freedom or 
his life? 
|? , MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah, 
14 I THE COURT: And you're also dealing with the 
15 rights of society to be free of people who commit murders? 
14 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
17 THE COURT: We're dealing with the possibility of 
punishment by reason of the death of the two victims in 
this case, and you're aware of that? 
20 I MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
lf THE COURT: Do you have any knowledge of this 
22 I case that came from any source other than— 
3 MS. SANCHEZ: No. I never heard of it before. 
2 4 J THE COURT: You didn't, before we qualified you, 
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